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This Article portrays the adoption of zoning laws as a turning point in
U.S. legal history where a new meaning was ascribed to the institution of
ownership. It explores the historic 1926 decision ofVillage of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., in which an ardently conservative Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of residential zoning. Unlike existing explanations, which view
the revolutionary decision either as a timely embrace of modern regulation or
as the product of middle-class interests, this Article perceives it as an outcome
of the evolving image ofprivate property. In pondering residential zoning, U.S.
lawyers, who were still attached to a Jeffersonian populist conception of
ownership, grappled with the realities of the twentieth century. The populist
conception of ownership advocated the proliferation of small landholding, but
novel actualities forced legal and political thinkers to reconsider the specific
form of small landholding that was to become prevalent. The yeoman, the
quintessential owner of old, morphed into the suburbanite, the new model
owner. Because this new model of the small landholder was adopted, property
rules had to be revised. The internal balance within the concept of property
was accordingly reworked, and the focus of the regulation of property rights
shifted in a manner that corresponded to the needs of the new model owner.
The entitlements associated with a property right in land became mostly
concerned with assuring the homeowner's security-protecting her from
intrusions and changes in the residential environment. This change inevitably
meant that property would entail less liberty of action than it had before, since
an owner's activities could interfere with the stability of the neighborhood and
the security of other owners. The subsequent changes in residential zoning laws
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both reflected and enabled this legal transformation that was made in order to
maintain, in a modern world, property's traditional populist role. This account
of the legal adoption of zoning seeks to highlight how ownership's ideological
underpinnings endure while the concept's specific components evolve.
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Introduction
A detached single-family home in a residential neighborhood can
symbolize many things. It can indicate freedom and security. It can represent
success and personal attainment. It can stand for the promise of America. The
spread of homeownership can also exemplify a darker side of the American
dream: in the midst of the worst recession in recent memory, rampant
homeownership, in the eyes of many, embodies reckless lending practices,
mindless public policies, and the resulting economic collapse.' But above all
else, the detached owner-occupied house stands for a certain idea of private
property. The modem homeowner is not merely the product of readily available
mortgages or of generous public subsidies; she is first and foremost the upshot
of a profound reform in the law of property.
Before President George W. Bush could endeavor to create an "ownership
society";2  before President Bill Clinton could proclaim a "National
Homeownership Day"3 (later to be expanded by his successor into "National
Homeownership Month") and then pressure Fannie Mae to increase mortgage
lending to low-income people; indeed, before government could even assume
6the role of promoting homeownership as it did following the New Deal, a
1. The proliferation of homeownership was the driving force (and the result) of a subprime
mortgage market run wild that directly led to the financial meltdown of 2008. It also impeded recovery,
as Americans found out that most of their wealth was tied up in one asset that had lost much of its value
and that curbed their ability to leave distressed communities for other locales where jobs were available.
See, e.g., Andrew J. Oswald, The Housing Market and Europe 's Unemployment: A Non-Technical
Paper, in HOMEOWNERSHIP AND THE LABOUR MARKET IN EUROPE 43 (Casper van Ewijk & Michiel
van Leuvensteijn eds., 2009) (claiming that high unemployment is caused by the decline of the rental
market and rise of homeownership). Accordingly, calls have been made for the abandonment of the
American embrace of suburban homeownership in favor of policies that would promote renting. See A.
Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Homeownership and Why Homeownership Is Not Always a Good
Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189 (2009); Richard Florida, How the Crash Will Reshape America, THE ATLANTIC,
Mar. 2009, at 44; James Surowiecki, Home Economics, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 10, 2008, at 62; The
Road Not Taken, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 21, 2009, at 31. But see Rachel D. Godsil & David V.
Simunovich, Protecting Status: The Mortgage Crisis, Eminent Domain, and the Ethic of
Homeownership, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 949 (2008).
2. "We're creating ... an ownership society in this country, where more Americans than ever
will be able to open up their door where they live and say, 'Welcome to my house. Welcome to my
piece of property."' Remarks to the National Association of Home Builders, Columbus, Ohio, 3 PUB.
PAPERS 2323, 2323 (Oct. 2, 2004).
3. Proclamation No. 6807, 60 Fed. Reg. 29,955 (June 6, 1995). In the Proclamation, President
Clinton explained, "homeownership is the cornerstone of our economy and a common thread in our
national life." Id.
4. Proclamation No. 7570, 67 Fed. Reg. 39,241 (June 4, 2002).
5. Steven A. Holmes, Fannie Mae Eases Credit To Aid Mortgage Lending, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
30, 1999, at C2. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are govemment-sponsored enterprises that purchase and
securitize mortgages. The federal government took over the two corporations and placed them into
conservatorship in September 2008, as it was feared that the financial crisis would lead to their collapse.
Stephen Labaton & Edmund L. Andrews, In Rescue To Stabilize Lending, U.S. Takes over Mortgage
Lending Titans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2008, at Al, A15.
6. For a survey of interventions in housing markets in the form of subsidies and taxes, see
EDWARD L. GLAESER & JOSEPH GYOURKO, RETHINKING FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY: How To MAKE
HOUSING PLENTIFUL AND AFFORDABLE 88-118 (2008). In fact, one of the most important subsidies to
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deeper transformation had to occur. The concept of ownership and its relation
to regulation had to shift. An altered image of ownership, that is modem while
at the same time traditional, that is new but still intertwined with old tenets of
American democracy, had to emerge. Once this process of reimagining one of
our most basic social and legal institutions was complete, governmental
policies serving the new notion not only became necessary but also evolved to
transcend political debate.7 In order to comprehend the role of homeownership
in the context of current day U.S. law and politics, this Article will explore that
historic transformation in the notion of ownership, which occurred early in the
twentieth century.
It was not the action of a major policymaker that set the wheels in motion
for this dramatic legal change. Rather, it was a real estate developer's
acquisition of land in the 1920s. When Ambler Realty purchased a vast tract of
land in the Village of Euclid, Ohio, it could not have imagined that this single
action was destined to leave an everlasting mark not only on that single
Cleveland suburb but also on the entire Nation. Ambler would have probably
forsaken this future distinction: for the uninvited notoriety among property
lawyers, historians, urban planners, and real estate developers, it paid a hefty
price-75% of the value of parts of the land it had purchased. Ambler Realty
did not believe that overnight the Village of Euclid could take away so much of
the land's value without paying it any compensation. Most legal commentators
of the time shared this disbelief.8 Accordingly, after the Village of Euclid
adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance that limited the use of Ambler's
land to single- and two-family dwellings,9 Ambler petitioned the federal court
for an injunction. The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
accepted Ambler's argument that the ordinance, in limiting an owner's freedom
of action, infringed on property rights in an unconstitutional manner.' 0
homeownership predated the New Deal-interest on mortgage payments has been tax deductible since
the inception of the modem federal income tax. The original act allowed for the deduction of "all
interest paid ... on indebtedness." Indebtedness, of course, included home mortgages even though they
were not very popular in the 1910s. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 167.
7. Therefore, even the collapse of the mortgage market and the ensuing financial crisis have
apparently not dampened the American appetite for government incentives to homebuying. The stimulus
package, adopted by Congress in February 2009 to combat the recession, provides for an $8,000 tax
credit for first-time homebuyers. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
§ 1006, 123 Stat. 202.
8. DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE 205
(1998); SEYMOUR I. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 168-69, 220-27 (1969).
9. The Village of Euclid was by no means the only municipality in America to adopt a zoning
ordinance during the 1920s. By the end of the decade, there were nearly 800 municipalities that had
adopted such controls. In fact, such proliferation was promoted by the proponents of zoning, as a means
to present the Court with afait accompli when litigation would arise, forcing the Court to stop a growing
tide of public action if it sought to strike down zoning. In addition, an Advisory Committee on Zoning
appointed by Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover drafted a Standard State Zoning Enabling Act,
presented by the federal government as a model act in 1924. TOLL, supra note 8, at 193-94, 201-02.
10. Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 312, 314, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924).
Ambler's petition was based on both the Federal and Ohio Constitutions. Since the relevant provisions
of the two are practically identical, I will follow the Court and refer solely to the U.S. Constitution.
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Yet then, in a decision that seemed to come like a bolt from the blue, the
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling, thereby changing the course
of U.S. property law. In accepting the municipality's appeal in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Court did much more than sanction the
pecuniary loss suffered by Ambler Realty; it endorsed a new form of urban
planning that would revolutionize the American landscape. Modem residential
zoning was constitutionally born. The Court ushered in a new era in the history
of property-an era in which ownership was to mean something different from
what it had meant in the preceding century. In post-Euclid America, ownership
came primarily to signify security rather than freedom.
Ambler Realty, to its dismay, found itself on the losing side of history, as
it continued to adhere to the notion of ownership as freedom. It could hardly
have believed its misfortune. Zoning's supporters were equally amazed.12 Even
in hindsight, the result of the case is extremely surprising. After all, the
Supreme Court that deliberated the case was the Court we now know as the
"Lochner Court." The Lochner Court Era, which lasted roughly from 1890 to
1937, was characterized by ample judicial reliance on the doctrine of
"substantive due process" to strike down federal and state regulation of private
business.13 Commentators at the time and ever since have come to view the
infamous decision in Lochner v. New Yorkl 4 as the emblem of this
jurisprudence. There, a law specifying maximum working hours for bakers was
invalidated as an unconstitutional interference with the right to contract.' 5 Such
an approach seemed to have spelled doom for zoning, and the proponents of
zoning knew it.'6
Nonetheless, the Court decided to reverse the district court's ruling and to
uphold the Village of Euclid's zoning ordinance by a six-to-three majority.
Strangely, zoning had found its champion in the most unlikely source: the
majority opinion was written by Justice Sutherland,17 soon to be a member of
11. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
12. The zoning movement itself conceived the Village of Euclid's appeal as a weak case for
several reasons. The village did not conduct a scientific survey before enacting the ordinance, and the
resulting ordinance struck many as arbitrary in some of its aspects, especially in the size and location of
zones it allocated to industry. Finally, the movement preferred the Court to consider an appeal of a
judgment in which zoning had been vindicated rather than the other way around. DANIEL R.
MANDELKER & ROBERT A. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 71 (2d
ed. 1985); TOLL, supra note 8, at 229, 232-33, 236.
13. The doctrine was read into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See ROBERT
G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 87-90, 101-05 (4th ed. 2005).
14. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
15. Id. at 64-65.
16. TOLL, supra note 8, at 168-69.
17. One of Justice Stone's former clerks noted in passing that Justice Sutherland was writing a
majority opinion holding the zoning ordinance to be unconstitutional, when conversations with the
dissenting Justices (especially Stone, so he believes) "shock[ed] his convictions and led him to request a
reargument, after which he changed his mind and the ordinance was upheld." Alfred McCormack, A
Law Clerk's Recollections, 46 COLUM. L. REv. 710, 712 (1946). Obviously, the truth of this claim
cannot be ascertained. Prior documents written by Justice Sutherland with regard to the zoning cases
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the notorious "Four Horsemen" that repeatedly struck down key components of
President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal legislation.18 This decision has
accordingly become "the one part of Sutherland's record that . . . continue[s] to
puzzle conservatives."' 9 Justice Sutherland was joined by the "liberals" on the
bench-Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone-as well as by Justice Sanford
and by Chief Justice Taft. The three remaining Horsemen dissented without
filing an opinion. If only to highlight the extraordinary nature of the odd
alliance that upheld this controversial measure, it merits mentioning that
Justices Sutherland and Holmes and Chief Justice Taft penned the three
contending opinions in the celebrated case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital of
20the District of Columbia, in which Sutherland's majority opinion breathed
fresh life into the gradually crumbling Lochner ruling.21 It might not be too
gross of an exaggeration to claim that "no American legal institution of the
twentieth century has managed to recruit a more improbable ensemble of
judges to support it [than zoning]."22
The supposedly progressive Euclid decision was and remains one of the
oddities of the seemingly conservative Lochner Court jurisprudence. 23 This fact
may account for the relative neglect of this decision by legal historians (in
contrast to the interest it has always sparked among historians of zoning and
indicate that he supported them all along. See Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due
Process in the Taft Court Era, 78 B.U. L. REv. 1489, 1543 n.259 (1998). Justice Sutherland was even
less likely to have formed a negative opinion (or any other opinion) following the first hearing of the
case-since he did not participate in it. In addition, other sources close to the Justices argued that the
rehearing was suggested by Justice Stone himself, who "as a new member of the Court .. . was not flilly
conversant with the situation." Arthur V.N. Brooks, The Office File Box-Emanation from the
Battlefield, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES STILL TO KEEP 3, 17 (Charles M. Haar &
Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989). It should also be noted that while the case was reargued, in order for a
majority intending to strike down the ordinance to transform into a six to three majority to refrain from
doing so, at least one other Justice (apart from Sutherland) must have switched his vote.
18. At the time, Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler, who "staunchly
opposed New Deal legislation were derided as the 'Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse' because their
strident warnings about the dangers of governmental regulations seemed to prophesy the imminent
demise of capitalism and democracy." See William G. Ross, The Hughes Court 1930-1941: Evolution
and Revolution, in THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 223, 246-48
(Christopher Tomlins ed., 2005).
19. HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A JURISPRUDENCE
OF NATURAL RIGHTS 70 (1994); see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & A. DAN TARLOCK, LAND USE
CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 50 (1981); TOLL, supra note 8, at 252. The lawyers representing the
losing appellees in the case expressed a great deal of surprise at the fact that Justice Sutherland, of all the
Justices on the Court, was the author of such an opinion. Brooks, supra note 17, at 20-21.
20. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
21. For more on the standing of the Lochner ruling in the 1920s and on the claim that in fact
Lochnerism was on the decline long before the Constitutional Revolution of 1937, see infra notes 92-93
and accompanying text.
22. TOLL, supra note 8, at 244.
23. More specifically, it forms an exception to the Court's otherwise narrow interpretation of
the police power. Donna Jalbert Patalano, Note, Police Power and the Public Trust: Prescriptive Zoning
Through the Conflation of Two Ancient Doctrines, 28 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 683, 707 (2001).
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24
planning). Such an anomaly in the Court's jurisprudence requires explanation
if we are to better understand the Progressive Era and the Court that confronted
it. Furthermore, even regardless of its specific historical contours, the decision
stands out as a watershed in the development of U.S. property law.
True, it is a misconception to view Euclid as the first anchor of zoning on
25this side of the Atlantic. Still, Euclid was unique. The ordinance at issue was
not merely meant to stop the intrusion of industry or commerce, or to regulate
building standards. The novelty was in the attempt to institute by law the
single-family (or two-family) house residential area. In so doing, and by
ensuring local control of development, Euclid was indispensable to the creation
of the modern residential suburb, which has left a lasting impact on U.S.
urbanism.26
More broadly, Euclid laid the groundwork for all modern forms of land
use regulation. Without the Court's decision in Euclid, there could have been
no constitutional basis for contemplating environmental regulations,27
28 29
preservation ordinances, exclusionary and inclusionary zoning, anti-sprawl
24. For a detailed history of the Village of Euclid ordinance and the litigation that ensued, see
TOLL, supra note 8, at 213-53. For information regarding the litigation, see also Michael Allan Wolf,
"Compelled by Conscientious Duty": Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. as Romance, 1997(2) S.
CT. HIST. 88.
25. It was preceded by several important regulatory measures. In 1901, New York enacted its
Tenement House Act, aimed at humanizing living conditions in Manhattan's Lower East Side. New
York first regulated housing practices in the Tenement House Act of 1867, which mandated that every
housing unit have fire escapes and every room have a window. The Act of 1901, however, was the first
instance of comprehensive regulation of building standards. See Steven E. Andrachek, Housing in the
United States: 1890-1929, in THE STORY OF HOUSING 123, 163-68 (Gertrude Sipperly Fish ed., 1979). It
was followed by similar acts adopted in other states, such as Connecticut, New Jersey, and Wisconsin.
See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman & Michael J. Spector, Tenement House Legislation in Wisconsin:
Reform and Reaction, 9 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 41 (1965). California adopted anti-nuisance laws, which
aimed at zoning out Chinese laundries in San Francisco. See, e.g., Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703
(1885); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884). San Francisco also adopted the first municipal
ordinance imposing residential segregation based on race-struck down by the federal circuit court in
1890. See In re Lee Sing, 43 F. 359 (C.C.D. Cal. 1890); NAYAN SHAH, CONTAGIOUS DIVIDES:
EPIDEMICS AND RACE IN SAN FRANCISCO'S CHINATOWN 71-72 (2001). In addition, the Supreme Court
approved height regulations enacted by the Massachusetts legislature for Boston (for the first time,
extending disparate treatment to different districts of the city) and a Los Angeles ordinance barring brick
kilns from residential districts. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Welch v. Swasey, 214
U.S. 91 (1909). In fact, in a series of decisions handed down in the first two decades of the century-and
often ignored by historical accounts of the Court's land use jurisprudence-the supposedly property-
rights oriented Fuller and White Courts sided with the State. Joseph G. Hylton, Prelude to Euclid: The
United States Supreme Court and the Constitutionality ofLand Use Regulation, 1900-1920, 3 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 1 (2000).
26. Michael Allan Wolf, The Prescience and Centrality of Euclid v. Ambler, in ZONING AND
THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 17, at 252, 261-62 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds.,
1989).
27. For more, see ROGER W. FINDLEY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 335-47 (7th ed. 2006).
28. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
29. See, e.g., Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian's Market: The Economics oflnclusionary
Zoning Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 23 (1996); J. Gregory Richards, Zoning for Direct Social
Control, 1982 DUKE L.J. 761.
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policies,30 and pro- or anti-gentrification measures.3 1 In other words, had the
lower court's opinion carried the day, the U.S. land market of the twentieth
century would have been governed by the rules of the nineteenth century. On
an even more profound level, property, as a legal and political institution,
would have borne in the twentieth century the same meaning it had in the
nineteenth century. As I hope to demonstrate in this Article, it is here, in the
reinvention of the essence of property, that one finds the true significance of the
Euclid decision.
I intend to supplement the prevalent accounts of the decision, which,
though not wholly incorrect, remain unsatisfactory. Two straightforward
explanations for the Court's seminal but seemingly uncharacteristic decision
have emerged over the years. The first perceives the Court as finally realizing
in Euclid that a new era had dawned in which social and economic
interdependence, the key term among realist jurists,32 necessitated novel and
progressive regulatory responses, such as zoning. 33 The second views the
decision as a glaring example of the Supreme Court's proclivity for serving the
middle classes, which were enamored with the suburbs. 34 While these
explanations are far from baseless, they oversimplify the Court's attitude, and
thus, misstate the decision's legal significance. In this Article, I promote a more
complex understanding of the story that will, in certain ways, bring the two
narratives together. Such a nuanced approach can better explain how the
Justices, who clearly adhered to different schools of thought, were able to
converge in Euclid.
The account I will propose conceives of Euclid as the reflection of a
traditional American conception of property adapted to the realities of the
twentieth century. At the heart of this American conception is a belief in the
liberating power of property, which leads to a commitment to the proliferation
of ownership. It can be dubbed the populist conception of property. This
conception was introduced and promoted by the Jeffersonian Republican
ideology of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; it persisted into
30. On anti-sprawl zoning, see, for example, Paul Cheshire & Stephen Sheppard, Taxes Versus
Regulation: The Welfare Impacts of Policies for Containing Urban Sprawl, in THE PROPERTY TAX,
LAND USE AND LAND USE REGULATION 147, 164 (Dick Netzer ed., 2003). However, it should be noted
that many anti-sprawl reformers view municipal autonomy-strengthened in Euclid-as a barrier to
meaningful anti-sprawl measures. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV.
2255, 2267-70 (2003).
31. For examples of such policies, see Peter J. MacDonald, Note, Displacement in Gentrifying
Neighborhoods: Regulating Condominium Conversion Through Municipal Land Use Controls, 63 B.U.
L. REV. 955 (1983); Peter Marcuse, Gentrfication, Abandonment, and Displacement: Connections,
Causes, and Policy Responses in New York City, 28 WASH. J. URB. CONTEMP. L. 195, 231-34, 237-40
(1985).
32. On the importance of the interdependent nature of the new economy for progressive legal
reasoning, see, for example, Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory,
47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 461 (1995).
33. See discussion infra Section H.A.
34. See discussion infra Section II.B.
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and beyond the twentieth century; 35 and it was, and still is, shared by
progressives and conservatives alike.3 6 It calls for property for all. But the
property to be dispersed widely should have, according to this theory, a certain
character in order to achieve its democratic goals. This desired character
evolves as economic, demographic, and social conditions change. Euclid, I will
argue, represents an important moment when Jefferson's model owner, the
yeoman, who had already been transformed during the nineteenth century into a
land speculator, turned into the suburbanite. This insight explains why Euclid
was much more than an anticipation of the New Deal or merely an anomaly in
the Lochner Court's jurisprudence; why it did more than just pave the way for
the varied forms of modem land use and real estate market regulations listed
above. Euclid was a major turning point in the history of the function assigned
to property in our liberal society.
This Article's main thrust will be to illustrate how Euclid exposed a clash
between constant ideological beliefs and changing urban sensibilities. This
clash generated a pragmatic shift in the legal conceptualization of property,
which allowed for the preservation of the core values traditionally associated
with ownership. On the one hand, the Court was loyal to old and unwavering
Jeffersonian tenets stressing the liberating function of property and the
accompanying idea that every citizen should have access to a small
landholding. On the other hand, the Court had to face a new world in which the
old conception of property, geared toward the needs and desires of the yeoman
and small-scale industrialist, could no longer protect-let alone satisfy-the
interests of the small landowner and entrepreneur. Property, in its traditional
reading, could no longer adequately serve its liberating and egalitarian roles.
For this reason, the Court changed its conception of property by shifting the
emphasis of property rights-at least in the residential district-from dynamic
development to tranquil security.
The Euclid Court handed down a new definition of property rights,
diverging from the old nineteenth-century image and meaning attached to it by
U.S. courts (and in this sense reverting to English models formerly rejected in
the United States). The purpose of a property right in its new conceptualization
was to guarantee the homeowner's security, to assuage her fears that
intemperate development might someday deprive her landholding of its
existing suburban environment. Inevitably, in order to perform this charge, the
new property right vested in the owner a much more limited freedom to
35. For example, it served as a weapon to discredit communism during the Cold War. See
LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMER'S REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR
AMERICA 125 (2003).
36. Conservatives joined to embrace what was originally part of a Jeffersonian "progressive"
platform as early as 1840. SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO
LINCOLN 187-88, 484-86 (2005). On the ways in which the myth of an "ownership society" has
appealed to all the distinct and allegedly competing strands of
American political self-understanding, see Robert Hockett, Whose Ownership? Which Society? 27
CARDozo L. REv. 1, 3 (2005).
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develop her land than property rights had previously done. Because an owner's
activities on her land might interfere with the stability of the neighborhood and
the security of other nearby owners, her liberty of action had to be constrained.
The reinvented property right was all about security, even at the expense of
freedom. It remains so. We still live today with this definition of property
rights, instituted by Euclid, even though its success might ultimately lead to the
downfall of some of the legal tools-among them zoning-that earlier were
indispensable to its creation and maintenance.37
In order to grasp the full dimensions of this new definition of property, I
will first briefly present the relevant factual and doctrinal background for the
Euclid analysis, exploring the notion of "suburban" zoning and the state of
constitutional property jurisprudence in the 1920s. Then, in Part II, I will turn
to the two established accounts of the Euclid decision as presented above-the
laudatory one and the censorious one-and examine their shortcomings. This
discussion will pave the way for Part III, which will set forth the explanation
based on the Jeffersonian populist conception of property. Finally, in Part IV, I
will examine the implications of this explanation, both for the historiography of
the Lochner Court, and for our understanding of the American
conceptualization of property in the twentieth century and beyond.
I. Background
A. The Village ofEuclid's Ordinance and the Term "Suburb"
In November 1922, the Village of Euclid, still largely farmland and
comprising fewer than ten thousand people, adopted an ordinance that divided
the municipality into six classes of use districts. In the most restricted of these
classes, the uses of land were limited to single-family dwellings, while in the
37. Over the last few years, the idea of zoning has come under effective legislative attack.
Ballot initiatives have been promoted, and in some states adopted, seeking to stop regulatory takings,
reverting to the idea-rejected in Euclid-that government effectively takes private property when
zoning laws limit how it can be used. This effort to "strengthen property rights" has been further fueled
by the backlash to the Court's decision in Kelo v. City ofNew London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), though that
decision dealt with the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment, not the Takings Clause. In Kelo, the
Court allowed the City of New London, Connecticut, to take the properties of plaintiff homeowners as
part of an economic development plan, even though the municipality planned to have the properties
eventually transferred into the hands of other private owners. Id. at 469-70. For more on the Public Use
Clause, see infra note 51. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1134 (LexisNexis 2010) (adopted in 2006 by
citizen initiative); OR. REV. STAT. § 195.305 (2007) (Oregon's famous Measure 37, adopted in 2004 by
citizen initiative, was upheld by the Oregon Supreme Court in MacPherson v. Dep't ofAdmin. Servs.,
130 P.3d 308, 322 (Or. 2006), and was somewhat modified by Measure 49, approved by the state voters
in 2007); TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2007.021-.026 (Vernon 2007); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001
(West 2007) (adopted by the legislature in 2006). In addition, California, Washington, and Idaho voted
on ballot initiatives that would have curtailed regulatory takings. See California Proposition 90 (2006);
Idaho Proposition 2 (2006); Washington Initiative 933 (2006). Nevada and Montana had the regulatory
taking component of their initiatives removed from the ballot by state courts for technical reasons. See
Montanans for Justice v. Montana, 146 P.3d 759, 776-77 (Mont. 2006); Nevadans for the Prot. of Prop.
Rights, Inc. v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1235 (Nev. 2006).
100
Vol. 28.1, 2011
The Reinvention of Ownership
second class (the one at issue in the case), the permitted uses were extended to
include two-family detached dwellings. In the third class, the introduction of
apartment buildings and public institutions was allowed; in the fourth class,
commercial activities were authorized; and in the fifth and sixth classes,
industry and manufacturing were permitted.3 8 The ordinance thus envisioned a
scheme of segregated yet diverse land uses. It did not commit the Village to
function as a purely middle-class residential community serving the adjoining
urban core of Cleveland. It was, in this respect, characteristic of the zoning
efforts of the time. It differed from some later zoning laws, which dedicated a
municipality in its entirety to single-family homes40 or banned apartment
buildings.4 1
The contrast between the specific contents of these ordinances highlights a
preliminary definitional problem that ought to be addressed. Throughout the
discussion of zoning and the Euclid decision it is almost impossible to avoid
resorting to the term "suburb." Justice Sutherland himself, in the opening lines
of the Euclid opinion, characterizes the Village of Euclid as "practically a
42suburb" of the city of Cleveland. What does that classification intimate?
Given the contents of the ordinance, the Village of Euclid does not meet
the stereotypical idea of a suburb. The word suburb means literally "beyond the
city" but it normally evokes a much narrower category of settlements: locales
that consist primarily-if not solely-of middle-class detached residences set
in the greenery of an open, park-like setting.43 Broken down to discernable
elements, the definition involves low population density, high rates of
homeownership, relatively elevated social status, and residents who make long
commutes to work.4 This definition, employed by social scientists, lacks a
38. The ordinance also established three classes of height districts and four classes of area
districts (each of the latter had different mandatory minimum lot sizes).
39. Not only did most zoning ordinances at the time allow for nonresidential uses within the
city limits, but many also dedicated vast tracts of land to such uses. The ordinances adopted in the 1920s
mimicked the groundbreaking New York City zoning ordinance from 1916 and were exuberantly
optimistic as to their respective cities' growth prospects. They accordingly tended to include zoning
allocation for business space set at fantastic levels. The practice was called overzoning. Burbank,
California, for example, with a population of 20,000, designed its ordinance to allow for a population
nearly seven times that number. But the street frontage it zoned for business use would have been
enough to serve 1.5 million people. Boulder, Colorado, allocated more than six times its actual business
area. For more, see TOLL, supra note 8, at 204-07.
40. See, for example, the zoning ordinance challenged in Village ofBelle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1974).
41. See, e.g., S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.
1975). In that case, the ordinance-zoned parts of the town for industry and others for retail use, but
permitted only single-family, detached dwellings in all residential zones. Apartments (and attached
townhouses) were not allowed anywhere in the township.
42. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 379 (1926).
43. ROBERT FISHMAN, BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS: THE RISE AND FALL OF SUBURBIA 5-6 (1987).
The word's origin is from Old French or Latin: "sub" means "near to" and "urb" means "city." NEW
OxFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010).
44. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES 6-10 (1987). Jackson sums up the American suburban experience: "affluent and middle-
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legal component: it does not require the suburb to be a separate political unit.
Hence, while the Village of Euclid as a whole would not be defined as a
suburb, specific neighborhoods within it-namely, those in which the use of
land was limited to single- or two-family detached dwellings-would.
This distinction renders the definition inoperable for legal purposes. The
suburb is not one of the entities recognized as such by local government law,45
and, as a descriptive phrase, it does not necessarily correspond to the nature of
any of the existing entities. For legal and policymaking purposes, "suburb" is
an informal, vague, and therefore not particularly useful term. 46  This
understanding is as true today as it was when the Village of Euclid adopted its
famous ordinance. If anything, the designation "suburb" has been rendered
even less coherent in light of recent demographic and economic trends in
metropolitan areas, and the extraordinarily diverse nature of the municipalities
that currently surround traditional urban centers.47 Indeed, the United States
Census, in surveying metropolitan areas, eschews the term suburb
completely-opting instead to define only principal cities and core urbanized
areas.48
The dichotomy that emerges at this early stage of the discussion is
between the suburb as an idea or an imaginary space and the suburb as a real
place or legal notion. While the first is extremely important, influential, and
seemingly clear, as will be discussed at length in Part III, the latter is muddled
and incoherent. From a purely legal-formal perspective, the term is irrelevant
and confusing; the relevant notion is that of residential zoning. At issue is the
municipal decision to limit the uses of land in certain parts of the
municipality-but not necessarily in all of its lands-to detached houses. The
class Americans live in suburban areas that are far from their work places, in homes that they own, and
in the center of yards that by urban standards elsewhere are enormous." Id. at 6.
45. The recognized forms of municipal government are cities, boroughs, towns, villages,
townships, plantations (in Maine) and locations (in New Hampshire). In addition, there are county
governments (in Louisiana, these are called parishes and in Alaska, boroughs). See LYNN A. BAKER &
CLAYTON P. GILLETrE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 46-49 (3d ed. 2004).
46. Hence the problematic nature of the basic premise of claims that American law serves the
"suburbs." For an example of such an argument, see Kenneth A. Stahl, The Suburb as a Legal Concept:
The Problem of Organization and the Fate of Municipalities in American Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV.
1193 (2008).
47. Consider, for example, Camden, New Jersey; Orange County, California; Oak Park,
Illinois; Westchester County, New York; Cambridge, Massachusetts; East St. Louis, Missouri;
Arlington, Virginia; and Village of Euclid, Ohio. These very different places can all be considered
"suburbs" of a central city. Or, take the example of San Jose, California-now more populous than the
central city to which it was historically subservient (San Francisco).
48. According to the definitions instituted by the Office of Management and Budget, a
metropolitan statistical area is "associated with at least one urbanized area that has a population of at
least 50,000. The Metropolitan Statistical Area comprises the central county or counties containing the
core, plus adjacent outlying counties having a high degree of social and economic integration with the
central county as measured through commuting." Standards for Defining Metropolitan and Micropolitan
Statistical Areas; Notice, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,228, 82,238 (Dec. 27, 2000). A metropolitan area thus may
consist of more than one urbanized core. In fact, it might also include more than one principal city
(though normally the latter is the largest city). There is no term describing communities within the
metropolitan area that are too small to meet the definitions of either urban core or urban cluster.
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Euclid Court had to determine whether such a decision runs afoul of
constitutional standards.
B. Constitutional Limits on the Regulation ofProperty in the Euclid Era
Two clauses in the Bill of Rights deal with the protection of private
property. The Due Process Clause, incorporated in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, bans federal and state governments from depriving persons of
property "without due process of law." The Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment provides, "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." This latter prohibition has been applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.49
Neither of these clauses removes from the states their police power,
recognized in the common law and encompassing the original power of
government to pass legislation regulating private conduct to protect the public
welfare. These constitutional provisions do, however, place limits on this state
power to regulate uses of private property. They subject a purported exercise of
the police power to two formally distinct constitutional tests. Under the due
process test, in order to fall within the legitimate purview of the police power,
the regulation must promote the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class. Actions made under the guise of
the police power ought to be reasonably necessary for serving the general
public safety, health, or morals.o According to this doctrine of substantive due
process, which the Court developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, if the courts are not persuaded that a regulatory measure in fact
accomplishes these legitimate goals of the police power, they must strike it
down as an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law.
Under the takings test, if the alleged police power measure amounts to an
exercise of the eminent domain power, compensation is mandated. When
exercising the police power, a state is not obliged to compensate the affected
private property owner in every circumstance; but when the eminent domain
power is invoked, the Fifth Amendment mandates compensation.51 Thus, the
49. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-39 (1897). The
Supreme Court previously held that, in and of itself, the Fifth Amendment does not apply to the states.
Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247-48 (1833).
50. See, e.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136-37 (1894).
51. This means that, technically speaking, as a takings case (as opposed to a due process case),
even if Euclid had been decided in favor of Ambler Realty, the village need not have forsaken its plan
altogether. Takings cases are only about compensation. If a takings claim is accepted by the court, the
governmental intrusion upon private property is not voided-the government is merely obliged to pay
due compensation. As a practical matter, of course, the government may choose to abort the action to
avoid the expense (and given the cost of paying compensation to all those affected by zoning, the policy
would have certainly been unsustainable had it been deemed a taking necessitating compensation). For a
plaintiff to be able to stop governmental action altogether (even when the government is willing to pay
her just compensation), she must rely on another requirement listed in the Fifth Amendment, which
holds that a taking must be made for a "public use." Ambler Realty could not have persuasively argued
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takings test tasks the courts with discerning the point at which an alleged
exercise of the police power encroaches on private property rights to such an
extent as to render it an employment of the eminent domain power.52
Until the 1870s, courts held that for an exercise of the police power to
cross the line separating that power from the eminent domain power, a physical
act carving out a part of the land and removing it from the hands of the owner
had to occur. Therefore, regulations that merely reduced the value of land by
restricting various uses (as did the later ordinance in Euclid) were not
considered takings because they did not physically appropriate the land.53
Accordingly, and since the Due Process Clause was rarely employed to strike
down police power measures, nineteenth-century America abounded with
regulation, limiting the use of private land to promote fire safety, health, and
morals.54
All this started to change a few years after the Civil War, at the same time
when the Supreme Court was developing its substantive due process
jurisprudence." The first step was made in 1871 when the Supreme Court
accepted the petition of owners whose land was destroyed by flooding caused
by a governmentally authorized dam. The Court rejected the respondents'
argument that the land had not been literally and physically "taken" from the
owners. As the Court explained:
[I]t would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if . .. it shall be held that
if the government refrains from the absolute conversion of real property to the
uses of the public it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and
permanent injury to any extent, can, in effect, subject it to total destruction
without making any compensation, because, in the narrowest sense of that word,
56
it is not taken for the public use.
that the Euclid zoning ordinance did not meet this standard. The Public Use Clause implies a ban on the
confiscation of land for a future, post-taking use that is not "public." In interpreting the term, the Court
has traditionally accorded legislators much latitude, finding almost all proposed future uses of land that
are believed by the taker to generate a public benefit to be public uses. Lately, some Justices and many
commentators have questioned the wisdom of this approach. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469, 497-501 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
52. JOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 1085-87 (3d ed.
2002).
53. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 132
(1977) (discussing Callendar v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 418 (Mass. 1823) and Lansing v. Smith, 8 Cow. 146
(N.Y. 1828), aff'd, 4 Wend. 9 (1829)); see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
54. See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 51-82, 149-233 (1996).
55. After the Civil War, there was a marked increase in the number of federal due process and
takings cases, as the post-war constitutional amendments applied the Due Process Clause, and, by the
Court's interpretation, the Takings Clause to the states. Before that, a challenge to a state exercise of the
eminent domain power had to be filed under the Contract Clause of the Constitution in Article I, Section
10.
56. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 177-78 (1871).
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This shift has been explained as a result of the judicial confrontation with
an emerging reality in which the most significant forms of property were
incorporeal. As land ceased to be the central form of wealth, conceptions of
property based on old principles of landholding became anachronistic. They
struck observers as alien to a modem economy dominated by intangible
objects, such as stocks. In this new world, the physical attributes of an asset
seemed less and less important. Judges were thus pressed to redefine the nature
of interference with property rights-even those in land-more abstractly; not
as an invasion of some physical boundary but as any action that reduces the
market value of property.s7 These redefinition efforts were not unrelated to new
ideological trends. Only when joined by a strong shift to individualism during
the 1870s, did the gradual movement away from traditional physical definitions
58
of property produce a major judicial expansion in constitutional doctrine. A
legal move was afoot: a conception of the right of property as social and
relative was being replaced by an individualized interpretation of the right.59 As
a result, the lax attitude toward regulation of property came into question.
Absorbing the new value-based, nonphysical definition of property, the
Court took the final and most dramatic step in reinventing takings law in the
1922 case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.60 In an opinion delivered by
Justice Holmes, the Court for the first time struck down a land use regulation as
an unconstitutional taking of property. Justice Holmes reasoned that a state law
forcing mining companies to conduct their operations in a way that would not
undermine support for surface structures (even in cases such as the one before
the Court, in which the owners of those structures had contracted to allow the
mining company to undermine said support) made it commercially
impracticable to mine certain varieties of coal, and thus, had very nearly the
same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying the right
to mine coal. 6 1 Though Justice Brandeis, in dissenting from Holmes's opinion,
tried to cling to old conceptions of a physical taking and of an expansive police
power, 62 "regulatory takings" law was bom. From then on, the vast majority of
takings cases would revolve around the 65uestion whether the regulation
challenged "goes too far," as Holmes put it, and is thus a taking." This was
57. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 147 (1992); James L. Kainen, The Historical Framework for Reviving
Constitutional Protection for Property and Contract Rights, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 112-13, 126-33
(1993).
58. Kainen, supra note 57.
59. NOVAK, supra note 54, at 47, 240.
60. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
61. Id. at 414.
62. Id. at 417-22.
63. Id. at 415.
64. For reinterpretations of the significance of the Pennsylvania Coal case, see WILLIAM A.
FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 24-53 (1995) (exploring the factual
background of the decision); Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings'
Jurisprudence": The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
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clearly an issue of degree, which left much to the discretion of the courts.6 One
of the first cases inviting the Court itself to exercise this discretion and to probe
the limits of the new doctrine was Euclid.
C. The Court's Decision
In Euclid, the Supreme Court ruled that the zoning ordinance under
scrutiny remained within the scope of the state's police power. The Court did
not even mention the Pennsylvania Coal decision.6 7 Apparently, Justice
Sutherland found that the ordinance satisfied the substantive due process test,
since it promoted the general public welfare. The case revolved around the
provisions of the ordinance that placed parts of Ambler Realty's land in the
second category of the Village of Euclid's use districts, where only single-
family or two-family detached residences could be constructed. In his majority
opinion, Justice Sutherland explained that it was easy for the Court to dispense
of Ambler's challenge to the exclusion of industry from its land by relying on
Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 666 (1996) (arguing that the Court at the time understood the case as a Due
Process Clause and Contract Clause case and not as a Takings Clause case; that it did not view it as a
seminal case instituting any new concept; and that it saw in the common law, and in a purpose-oriented
inspection of the contested legislation, key components of the constitutional analysis); and William M.
Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813 (1998)
(arguing that the decision is mistakenly read as pro-property rights and anti-government).
65. This approach to legal problems and to the role of the courts in solving them befits the
more realist jurisprudence, characteristic of Justice Holmes, en route to replace the debunked categorical
thinking of Classical Legal Thought. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT (2006); Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 465 (1988) (reviewing
LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)).
66. The Court set a rather lenient reasonableness test for zoning ordinances (only clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable ones were to be struck down), which were also to enjoy a presumption of
validity. For more on the Euclid standard and later judicial attitudes toward it, see Jerold S. Kayden,
Judges as Planners: Limited or General Partners?, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note
17, at 223. The Court was to find this presumption rebutted, and to strike down a zoning ordinance for
its unreasonableness, two years later, again in a decision written by Justice Sutherland, in Nectow v. City
of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). The reasonableness standard represents a blurring of the lines
between takings law and substantive due process law. Steven J. Eagle, Property Tests, Due Process
Tests and Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 899, 906-07. In Euclid, the Court did
not find it necessary to distinguish the Takings Clause from the Due Process Clause (therefore the
decision could, at least originally, be read as a substantive due process case). Euclid, in this sense, sowed
the seeds of the Agins v. Tiburon formula, according to which a governmental action that does not
"substantially advance" a legitimate state interest is a taking. 447 U.S. 255, 260-63 (1980). Agins was
overruled in 2005 when the Court held that this formula had invaded takings jurisprudence from the
substantive due process jurisprudence that the Court had abandoned in the late 1930s. Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
67. Justice Sutherland's opinion never mentions the Pennsylvania Coal decision, despite the
fact that the district court, in striking down the zoning ordinance under review, heavily relied on it.
Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 311-14 (N.D. Ohio 1924). Treanor argues that
Sutherland did not cite Pennsylvania Coal since Holmes's balancing property jurisprudence, established
in that case, was not clearly articulated at the time. Sutherland and others failed to understand it and
appreciate its applicability, and hence Euclid relied on classic police power rationales. See Treanor,
supra note 64, at 862-63.
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precedents. 68 The crux of the case was the provisions of the Village of Euclid's
zoning ordinance that barred commercial activity and apartment houses.
Sutherland then moved on to uphold the constitutionality of these restrictions as
well. In the next Parts of this Article, I will examine first the explicit reasoning
provided by the Court for this ruling and then turn to the underlying causes,
clues for which may be detected in Justice Sutherland's opinion.
II. The Prevalent Accounts of the Court's Embrace of Zoning
A. Zoning as the Progressive Regulatory Response to the New
Interdependent City
Justice Sutherland provides the main explanation for his ruling in favor of
the Village of Euclid in the following paragraph:
Building zone laws are of modem origin. They began in this country about
twenty-five years ago. Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple;
but with the great increase and concentration of population, problems have
developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and will continue to
require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private
lands in urban communities. Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of
which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now
uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would
have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations are sustained,
under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons analogous to those which
justify traffic regulations, which, before the advent of automobiles and rapid
transit street railways, would have been condemned as fatally arbitrary and
unreasonable. And in this there is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of
constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand
or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly
coming within the field of their operation. In a changing world, it is impossible
that it should be otherwise. .. 9
In these sentences, Justice Sutherland describes two changes: one in urban
reality, and another, necessitated by the first and introduced by the decision, in
the legal regime. Much of the appraisal of Euclid and of its place in the
Lochner Court's legacy has been based on these words of Justice Sutherland. In
this Section, I will trace this common explanation of the Euclid decision that
perceives it as a timely legal reform introduced in response to real world
68. Justice Sutherland cited the following cases: Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526
(1917) (dealing with a city ordinance requiring the consent of a majority of the property owners for the
placement of billboards in residential areas); Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)
(discussing the Los Angeles kiln regulation); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (pertaining to
a regulation banning livery stables from certain parts of the city); and Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91
(1909) (concerning the Boston height regulation).
69. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926).
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changes. I will first show why Euclid departed from traditional legal doctrine
and laissez-faire ideology, but then I will question the validity of the urban
transformations mentioned by Justice Sutherland as a justification for this
departure. I will thereby show that it is a mistake to perceive Euclid as an
endorsement of new forms of regulation in reaction to objective developments.
Common wisdom notwithstanding, the novelty of the decision lies elsewhere.
1. Euclid as the Product of the "Living Constitution"
As presented by Justice Sutherland, Euclid is the product of the "living
70
Constitution" being adjusted to the new realities of modem urbanism. When
this line of argument is accepted at face value, Euclid represents a rare instance
of the Lochner Court demonstrating flexibility and realism. Here, a Court that
at the time (and still today) was often criticized for being unable to grasp the
changing social and economic realities of the Progressive Era, for hanging on
71
to old notions suitable to bygone times, undertook an exploratory move
forward.
Many have interpreted the decision in this fashion, and hence, extol it as
one of the clearest manifestations of the adaptability of legal doctrine. Robert
Post notes, "Justice Sutherland authored for the Court a strongly forward-
looking opinion.... Sutherland boldly invoked the 'comprehensive reports' of
'commissions and experts' to portray urban land as subject to 'complex
conditions' of interdependence. . . ."72 Charles Haar and Michael Wolf present
"the language and legacy of Euclid as an example of Progressive jurisprudence.
Imbued with the spirit of late nineteenth-century pragmatism and grounded in
early twentieth-century political and ideological realities."73 The Justices in
Euclid "endorse[d] the view that legislative and administrative efforts often
result in social and economic progress for the commonweal."74 James Stoner
70. The notion of the Constitution as a living, flexible document whose interpretation can and
should change as time passes can be traced to Chief Justice John Marshall's famous words from
McCulloch v. Maryland that "the [Clonstitution [was] intended to endure for ages to come, and
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
71. Most famous in this context was Roscoe Pound's denunciation of the chasm between "law
in books" and "law in action." Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12
(1910).
72. Post, supra note 17, at 1542-43.
73. Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival of Progressive
Jurisprudence, 115 HARv. L. REV. 2158, 2160 (2002).
74. Id. at 2197. Joseph Sax also praises Justice Sutherland's flexible and progressive approach
to the protection of property rights and laments the absence of similar reasoning today. Joseph L. Sax,
Why America Has a Property Rights Movement, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 513, 520. For similar praise, see
Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the Roots of the
Takings 'Muddle', 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 913 (2006). See also Tom Pierce, A Constitutionally Valid
Justification for the Enactment of No-Growth Ordinances: Integrating Concepts of Population
Stabilization and Sustainability, 19 U. HAw. L. REv. 93, 142-43 (1997) (urging courts today to follow
Sutherland's insightful approach to the necessities engendered by population growth); William M.
Randle, Professors, Reformers, Bureaucrats, and Cronies: The Players in Euclid v. Ambler, in ZONING
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sums up this perspective by hailing the decision as "one of the most important
opinions justifying [legal change]."
2. The Relationship Between Euclid and Traditional Doctrine and
Principles
Not all have embraced this vision of change. Some commentators believe
the decision did not reflect any doctrinal shift and was no more than the product
of existing property and tort rules. These writers contend that traditional
nuisance law-to which Justice Sutherland refers in his opinion-is key to
understanding the approval of zoning by a court deeply immersed in
substantive due process jurisprudence and committed to the protection of
property and contract rights from regulation. The argument asserts that as the
common law defined the perimeters of substantive due process, zoning was
76
saved because it was premised upon the common law governing nuisances.
The common law grants an owner a cause of action against a neighbor who
interferes in an unreasonable and substantial fashion with her use or enjoyment
of land.77 Law has thereby always restricted property rights. Zoning not only fit
in with the traditional common law, but also, in that manner, was fully
compatible with the Lochner jurisprudence-which allowed interferences with
property and contract rights only when those interferences could be derived
from common law categories. 8
Yet, it is very hard to rest the whole decision upon the relatively narrow
shoulders of nuisance law. To accept such a theory, we must believe that
Justice Sutherland (and his brethren) failed to see that even though both are
related as forms of regulating conflicting land uses, zoning represented a giant
AND THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 17, at 31, 54 (attributing the decision to Sutherland's ability to
adjust to the realities of a changing world).
75. JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON LAw LIBERTY: RETHINKING AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 141 (2003).
76. ARKES, supra note 19, at 70-71; Melvyn R. Durchslag, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., Seventy-Five Years Later: This Is Not Your Father's Zoning Ordinance, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
645, 645-46 (2001).
77. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 669, 696 (Cal. 1996).
78. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Euclid's Lochnerian Legacy, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN
DREAM, supra note 17, at 278, 280-85. For more on the role of nuisance law in the decision, see
STONER, supra note 75, at 142, 147; Charles M. Haar, Reflections on Euclid: Social Contract and
Private Purpose, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 17, at 333, 336-38; and Michael A.
Wolf, Fruits of the "Impenetrable Jungle": Navigating the Boundary Between Land-Use Planning and
Environmental Law, 50 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 5, 27-33 (1996). Eric Claeys has more
recently argued that originalism provides conservatives with a coherent nuisance-based theory of the
Takings Clause. Eric R. Claeys, Takings and Private Property on the Rehnquist Court, 99 Nw. U. L.
REv. 187, 194-99, 208-09 (2004). For a critique of both claims, that is, that nuisance law can generate a
comprehensive Takings Clause jurisprudence and that such an approach is supported by originalism, see
Stewart E. Sterk, The Inevitable Failure of Nuisance-Based Theories of the Takings Clause: A Reply to
Professor Claeys, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 231, 232-39 (2004).
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doctrinal leap from nuisance law.7 And even if we assume that zoning was
nothing more than an adjustment in the law of nuisance, we still have to explain
how nuisance law helped to legitimize the specific contents of the Village of
Euclid's zoning ordinance. The ordinance banned uses, such as the construction
of apartment buildings, which had never before been deemed nuisances in U.S.
law. In fact, the very offensive effects of apartment buildings that Justice
Sutherland mentioned as necessitating their exclusion from the residential
district have traditionally been rejected as grounds for a nuisance claim in most
of the states. Sutherland explains that apartment buildings "interfer[e] by their
height and bulk with the free circulation of air and monopoliz[e] the rays of the
sun which otherwise would fall upon the smaller homes."80 The vast majority
of U.S. courts, however, would hold (then and now) that an owner is not liable
in nuisance for any interference with her neighbor's interests in a free flow of
light and air. As the rule in most jurisdictions goes, there is no "easement for
light and air" in the absence of an explicit contract to that effect between the
two neighbors. 1 The zoning ordinance, therefore, did not merely codify
nuisance law rules. It created new rules. Post justifiably dismisses the argument
that the decision was based on common law conceptions of nuisance law and
holds that it was much more innovative.82 Haar and Wolf perhaps best
characterize Sutherland as seeking guidance in the common law but by no
means allowing it to control the scope of the police power.83
Even if Euclid was a doctrinal innovation, however, some have argued
that it represented no departure from traditional theory. Joel Paschal, Justice
Sutherland's early biographer, claimed that the decision could squarely be
situated within nineteenth-century laissez-faire ideology. He contended that the
decision actually resonated with Herbert Spencer's Social Darwinist theory,
which exerted a decisive influence on U.S. conservatives at the time in general
and on Sutherland throughout his career in particular.84 Spencer vehemently
denied the existence of a social quality in man. It was solely the growth of
79. For a discussion of some of the important differences between nuisance as a private law
claim and public zoning laws, see infra notes 111-115 and accompanying text.
80. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926).
81. The case most famously stating the rule is Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five
Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 360 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
82. Post, supra note 17, at 1544.
83. Haar & Wolf, supra note 73, at 2178-79. Kenneth Stahl has argued that "asserting that
zoning for the protection of the single-family home was merely an application of nuisance law
principles" enabled the Court to "recapitulat[e] zoning as a collective private property right belonging to
the community," as a local entitlement rather than a delegation from the state. Stahl, supra note 46, at
1266-67.
84. JOEL F. PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE 9-15 (1951).
Herbert Spencer, the nineteenth-century English philosopher, was probably the most prominent
promoter of Social Darwinism at the time. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINIsM IN
AMERICAN THOUGHT (1955). Perhaps the most famous reference to his work appeared, paradoxically, in
Justice Holmes's celebrated dissent in the Lochner decision, where he forcefully stated: "The Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics" (Spencer's first published book).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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numbers that was responsible for the existence of any social state. Hence,
according to his theory, over-population is capable of justifying political
power-and was indeed applied in this manner to Sutherland's legitimization
86of zoning. But this interpretation of Spencer is somewhat contrived,
especially because it cannot distinguish the case of zoning from other forms of
modem regulation, to which Spencer, Sutherland, and other conservatives were
hostile. Consequently, the general opinion is that Sutherland was, at the very
least, taking a step or two beyond Spencer. 7
3. Change and the Lochner Court
The decision cannot be written off as simply an offspring of traditional
nuisance doctrine and laissez-faire principles. Grasping the interdependent
nature of modem life, the Court apparently tossed aside the laissez-faire
ideology with which it has often been associated. Justice Stone's biographer
has gone so far as to argue that the Euclid decision, coming as it did soon after
the nomination of Stone, was part of the swing of the Court during the second
half of the 1920s from right to left, a swing that would eventually deeply
trouble Chief Justice Taft.89 Eric Claeys, a modem conservative commentator,
has lamented the decision for the same reason. In Euclid, he contends, the
Court traded its old natural rights freedom-oriented ideology for the
Progressives' relativistic, communitarian, governance-oriented ideology.90
While Claeys's description of a seismic shift is certainly greatly
exaggerated, 91 the more subtle line of reasoning-highlighting the flexible and
even progressive outlook of the Court revealed in Euclid-is not that far-
fetched. The common view of the Lochner Court as a static archconservative
bastion, eventually toppled by the Constitutional Revolution of 1937,92 no
85. HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS 31 (abr. and rev. ed., Williams & Norgate 1892)
(1851).
86. PASCHAL, supra note 84, at 127.
87. Joe R. Feagin, Arenas of Conflict: Zoning and Land Use Reform in Critical Political-
Economic Perspective, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 17, at 73, 83.
88. This association was most famously made in Justice Holmes's dissent in Lochner, 198
U.S. at 75.
89. ALPHEUS T. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 251-62 (1956).
90. Eric R. Claeys, Euclid Lives? The Uneasy Legacy of Progressivism in Zoning, 73
FORDHAM L. REv. 731, 736-62 (2004).
91. Haar and Wolf show the exaggeration in their critique of his article. See Charles M. Haar
& Michael Allan Wolf, Yes, Thankfully Euclid Lives, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 771, 777-85 (2004). Claeys
in his article simply adopted unconditionally Ambler's version of the case (as pitting individual property
rights against communistic control). For a discussion of Ambler's arguments, see Brooks, supra note 17,
at 5-10, 12-16.
92. The Constitutional Revolution of 1937 refers to the dramatic reversal of course by the
Court that seemed to have occurred in that year. First, and most famously, in a stunning decision later
dubbed "The Switch in Time that Saved Nine," the Court shelved substantive due process. West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), overruling Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
It then broadened the federal government's power under the Commerce Clause (a jurisprudential shift
that was to culminate with Wickardv. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1942)). For more on the post-1937
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longer commands universal respect. Robert McCloskey, for example, explains
that most of the era's Justices had played some part in practical affairs and their
hostility to regulation in general was tempered with the realization that
particular circumstances cannot always be governed by dogmatism. As a result,
in practice, they used the veto power, inherent in substantive due process and
other doctrines, selectively and judiciously. "The vision of judicial tyranny that
emerges from some of the critical literature of the 1920s and 1930s" is,
McCloskey argues, "pretty remote from the fact."93 In a somewhat similar vein,
Hadley Arkes, Justice Sutherland's sympathetic biographer, explains
Sutherland's decision in Euclid as emanating from an oft-ignored but
fundamental moral inclination among conservative Justices to presume in favor
of local regulations rooted in genuine concerns-in this case, health concerns-
associated with the police power. Conservatives such as Sutherland, Arkes
claims, were deeply committed to natural rights, but they did not assume that
these rights were not limited. Zoning laws, for Sutherland, began with the
maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas ("use your property so as not to
damage another' S",).94
Even without accepting Arkes's attempt at humanizing the whole body of
conservative jurisprudence of the Lochner Court,95 it is clear that the Euclid
case illustrated that Justice Sutherland had "a strain of constitutional realism"
(which was also apparent in a few other cases).96 Sutherland and other
conservative members of the Court were able to absorb some strands of the
earlier and more conservative progressive-realist legal critique.97 When
Court, see, for example, JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 126-34 (2d ed. 1998); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG,
THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 213-36
(1995); and MCCLOSKEY, supra note 13, at 117-20, 123-26.
93. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 13, at 92.
94. ARKES, supra note 19, at 70-71.
95. Arkes's analysis might be perceived as tainted by his explicit goal of reestablishing Justice
Sutherland and the natural rights jurisprudence as beacons for conservative thinking. Id. at 20-38. In
fact, Arkes's somewhat enigmatic treatment of the Euclid case illustrates the lengths to which he goes to
restore Sutherland's jurisprudence. Zoning is the second example of the relevance of Sutherland's
legacy that Arkes lists in the opening page of his work, meant to explain the importance of his subject.
Id. at ix. On the next page, he returns to zoning as an illustration of the necessity to recognize both the
moral grounds for the right of property and the moral grounds for its restriction. He then argues that
modern uses of the zoning power far exceed the original understanding of zoning's role-an
understating Arkes never specifies but attributes to Sutherland-and therefore conservative judges have
started to limit the power. In doing so, he continues, "they are working their way back to the ground that
Sutherland prepared for them"-ground which, again, Arkes never identifies (and it is far from clear that
Sutherland himself ever did). Id. at x. Yet, perhaps the oddest aspect of the work's treatment of zoning is
that after this extensive discussion in the first couple of pages, where it is presented as one of the main
themes of the book to come, Arkes only returns to zoning in two later paragraphs. Id. at 70-71.
96. David Burner, George Sutherland, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 2133, 2138-39 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel
eds., 1969); see Samuel R. Olken, Justice Sutherland Reconsidered, 62 VAND. L. REv. 639, 678-81
(2009).
97. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 104, 109-10, 145, 158 (1993).
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examining whether a public measure was promoting the general welfare rather
than some class interest and was thus a constitutional exercise of the police
power, they were willing to expand the definition of "general welfare" and to
take into account a richer set of facts discerned by scientific observations.98
Euclid might indicate this growing openness on the part of the Court to claims
regarding new realities affecting the public health and might reflect the
Justices' willingness to rely, in accordance with the spirit of the times, on
planners' and other experts' opinions proving these developments. 99
Furthermore, Euclid is not the sole anomaly in the Court's otherwise
conservative jurisprudence of those years. There are a few others, perhaps most
notably the Nebbia decision where the Court allowed the regulation of milk
prices. 0o Such decisions have led some to argue that in 1937 there was no
revolution-Lochnerism (in its narrow sense) had died before in a gradual
process.101
4. Did Urban Realities Change in a Manner Justifying Legal Change?
Euclid can be read as an indicator of the Court's readiness to catch up
with the march of history. But Justice Sutherland's reasoning to that effect in
Euclid can be faulted for two major historical mistakes: one in his portrayal of
legal history, the other in his narrative of urban history. As can be deduced
from the discussion in Section I.B of this Article, Justice Sutherland's
estimation that regulations acceptable in the early twentieth century (such as
those examined in Euclid) would not have been upheld a hundred or even fifty
years earlier is somewhat improbable. "Regulatory taking" was a term coined
only four years earlier, while previous courts had been reluctant to strike down
regulations that did not actually remove title.102 Hence the perception of the
Court as loosening its constitutional standards with the aim of accommodating
new developments in everyday life is misleading. In addition, there is yet
another, and much more important, question for contemplation: did new
98. The best known example of this attitude was in the Court's handling of the "Brandeis
Brief' in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). The Court commented positively on the brief, which
extensively surveyed researches in the social sciences regarding working women's lives rather than
focusing on legal arguments, in support of the successful effort by Louis Brandeis (at the time, still a
lawyer) to defend a maximum working hours law for women. Id. at 419-23.
99. On the triumph of American professionalism in the Progressive Era and the ensuing
judicial appropriate deference to expertise, as evident in Euclid, see Haar & Wolf, supra note 73, at
2182-84. The zoning movement was quite aware of this new public and judicial attitude: litigating cases
around the country, it deliberately adopted in advance a tactic of heavy reliance on scientific evidence,
so as to cater to the preferences of the courts-and the public. Martha A. Lees, Preserving Property
Values? Preserving Proper Homes? Preserving Privilege?: The Pre-Euclid Debate over Zoning for
Exclusively Private Residential Areas, 1916-1926, 56 U. Prr. L. REv. 367, 398-401 (1994).
100. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
101, Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 881,
983 (2005). But see Bruce Ackerman, Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 YALE L.J. 2279, 2335 (1999).
102. In fact, even loss of title did not guarantee compensation, as the example of the removal
of roads from private hands indicates. See NOVAK, supra note 54, at 121-30.
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objective developments warranting such accommodation truly exist, as Justice
Sutherland and the many commentators who have celebrated the decision over
the decades argue?
Counterintuitively, it is far from clear that the answer should be yes.
Justice Sutherland would have liked for us to believe that new realities
appearing on city streets required new planning regulations-just as the advent
of automobiles dictated traffic regulation. This analogy that Justice Sutherland
employs in his opinion is deeply flawed. Automobiles were a new reality; they
did not roam the streets of ancient Rome or colonial Boston. Dynamic and
diversified urbanism was no such new reality; very far from it. The city has
been the stage for numerous and varying uses since time immemorial. Never
was "urban life . . . comparatively simple," as Sutherland reminisces.lo3
Commerce, government, industry, leisure facilities, and residences were all
mixed together on the streets of the ancient, medieval, renaissance, baroque,
and colonial cities. In many of these cities, these differing and competing uses
of land took place not only on the same street but also within the same building.
Cities, as complex human conglomerates, never effectively segregated land
uses. Throughout history, the city has been a hodgepodge of assorted
individuals, establishments, pursuits, and interactions. l0 4 There was, in this
respect, nothing new about the urban reality of the early twentieth century (or
of our own times).
True, the nineteenth century witnessed the introduction of manufacturing
on a scale unknown before; but, as explained in Section I.C of this Article,
Euclid was not dealing with the exclusion of industry. Therefore, the only
relevant change was a change in social norms, which beginning in the
eighteenth century, in a gradual process, started calling for the separation of
home from work, and then for the separation of home from city. Business and
congestion-unlike automobiles-were not new; the innovation was the
popular reluctance to have a residence in proximity to a place of business or
planted in the midst of urban congestion.105 The recent emphasis on the nuclear
family and the cult of domesticity generated a new housing preference that
trickled down from the upper to the middle classes.' 0 6
103. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926).
104. See, e.g., FISHMAN, supra note 43, at 7-8, 20-21; LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CITY IN
HISTORY: ITS ORIGINS, ITS TRANSFORMATIONS, AND ITS PROSPECTS 219, 281-82, 284-85 (1961). in
fact, forms of land use regulation, similar in some ways to zoning, could be found in the early Roman
Republic, in late sixteenth-century London, and even in the first American colonies. John R. Nolon,
Comprehensive Land Use Planning: Learning How and Where To Grow, 13 PACE L. REv. 351, 356
(1993) (including references).
105. This is not to say that the automobile was irrelevant to this development. By reducing the
price of land within acceptable commuting time to city jobs, it rendered suburban lands more accessible
to lower classes and commercial uses, rendering the task of keeping those lands exclusive more difficult.
Robert H. Nelson, Zoning Myth and Practice-From Euclid into the Future, in ZONING AND THE
AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 17, at 299, 300-01.
106. FISHMAN, supra note 43, at 31-38.
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Attentiveness to these new sensibilities and desires of the upper and
middle classes seems to have implicitly informed the Court's opinion even
more than new objective developments. Let us now turn our attention to the
role of these sensibilities and desires.
B. Zoning as the Middle Class's Defensive Regulatory Response to the New
Diverse City
The Euclid decision can be, and has been, read as purposefully serving
tangible class interests. Following many other commentators, I will show in
this Section how zoning corresponded to the housing interests of the middle
classes in the early twentieth century. But while this Section will illustrate that
if the legal acceptance of zoning is to be understood, class interests, and more
specifically, middle-class interests, must be considered, it will also aim to
explain why these tangible interests cannot-by themselves-paint the
complete picture. Parts III and IV will accordingly add more layers to the class
interests explanation presented in this Section. The starting point for any such
discussion, however, is the Court's attitude toward the middle-class residential
neighborhood.
1. The Importance of Zoning for the Maintenance of the Detached-
Residence Neighborhood
Nowhere has the middle-class suburban urge been more apparent in U.S.
housing rhetoric than in the disparaging view of apartment houses. It should be
recalled that Justice Sutherland regarded the constitutionality of the exclusion
of apartment buildings from the detached-residence neighborhood as the main
issue before the Court. The prominence given to this aspect of the Village of
Euclid ordinance is somewhat surprising: Ambler Realty was not seeking to
build apartment houses on its land but rather fancied industrial and commercial
development.'0 7 Nonetheless, the Court, swayed by the litigation tactics of both
parties, focused on this issue, upholding the ordinance's ban on apartment
buildings. Justice Sutherland justified this move in the following terms:
With particular reference to apartment houses, it is pointed out that the
development of detached house sections is greatly retarded by the coming of
apartment houses, which has sometimes resulted in destroying the entire section
for private house purposes; that in such sections very often the apartment house
is a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and
attractive surroundings created by the residential character of the district.
Moreover, the coming of one apartment house is followed by others, interfering
by their height and bulk with the free circulation of air and monopolizing the
107. The Court could have easily avoided the constitutional issue for several other reasons as
well. See Haar, supra note 78, at 334-35.
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rays of the sun which otherwise would fall upon the smaller homes, and
bringing, as their necessary accompaniments, the disturbing noises incident to
increased traffic and business, and the occupation, by means of moving and
parked automobiles, of larger portions of the streets, thus detracting from their
safety and depriving children of the privilege of quiet and open spaces for play,
enjoyed by those in more favored localities,-until, finally, the residential
character of the neighborhood and its desirability as a place of detached
residences are utterly destroyed. Under these circumstances, apartment houses,
which in a different environment would be not only entirely unobjectionable but
highly desirable, come very near to being nuisances.10 8
Apartment houses "retard," "destroy," "monopolize," "interfere," and
"deprive;" they are "mere parasites," which "take advantage" of a desirable
environment created by others while carrying "disturbing noises," and bringing
an "occupation" of the streets.109 Obviously, faced with the onslaught of these
invading Huns-a nuisance if there ever were one-the peaceful single-family
residences should be allowed to mount barricades-in the form of zoning-to
fight back.
Though derogative and intolerant, Justice Sutherland's description does
make economic sense. Indeed, what renders the suburban dream so elusive is
that when a desirable "naturalistic" and exclusive environment is found,
developers are quick to buy empty spaces and subdivide them into smaller and
smaller lots to reap larger dividends-thereby destroying the area's exclusive
character.110 By legitimizing zoning, the Court allowed the government to
intervene and break this vicious and inefficient cycle. If localities were not able
to exclude denser development, then, at least theoretically, all neighborhoods
could become dense. Owners would be locked into a coordination problem. An
owner would have no incentive to invest in her residential property since at any
given time her neighbor might be tempted to construct lucrative commercial
facilities or apartment buildings whose presence would devalue her residential
property. Zoning solves this problem.
Unlike nuisance law, zoning assures stability. While the private law's
nuisance cause of action deals with one specific, already existing problem in
the present environment, leaving room for future change, zoning freezes in the
current uses of the land forever (or until the zoning ordinance is amended-a
legally and politically complicated move)."' Nuisance law places the cost of
108. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394-95.
109. Id. at 394.
110. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Economics of U.S. Low Income Housing Markets in Light of
"Informality" Analysis, 4 J. L. SoC'Y 71, 89-92 (2002). Before the advent of zoning, this process
actually happened-as single-family units were divided into smaller and smaller units to house larger
numbers of lower-class families (or to solve other economic or construction problems encountered by a
developer). See SAM BASS WARNER, JR., STREETCAR SUBURBS: THE PROCESS OF GROWTH IN BOSTON,
1870-1900, at 161-62, 178-86 (2d ed. 1978) (presenting the example of Central Dorchester).
Ill. A rezoning ordinance is much more likely to count as a taking (and thus require the
payment of just compensation) than an original zoning ordinance, since an owner might be found to
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initializing litigation on the landowner, ex post, after her enjoyment of her land
has already been disturbed. Zoning frees her from this burden, making the
municipality an ex ante preventer of conflicting uses. Moreover, if private law
bestows upon a landowner the ability to bring a nuisance suit against one user
of land bothering her today-with no assurances for the future-zoning laws
serve her better: they will fend off for eternity all greedy subdividers. Zoning
laws thereby protect investments in single-family homes from the depreciating
effects of other usesll2 and are a particularly useful mechanism for the
maintenance of exclusive neighborhoods."1 3
2. The Desirability of the Detached-Residence Neighborhood
Zoning can thus be justified, as it was by Justice Sutherland, as an
efficient tool of land use regulation,' 14 whose goal is to assure the stability of
exclusive neighborhoods. Yet for this economic analysis to be meaningful, it
must assume this latter goal. It must be accepted that detached-residence
neighborhoods carry inherent value, that is to say, that they are a good to be
promoted. While Justice Sutherland's opinion and simplistic forms of economic
analysis might imply otherwise, the desirability of neighborhoods with
detached single-family houses is not a given; it is by no means preordained.
Rather, it is a product of social preferences. Modem society has placed a
premium on this form of living.' 15 The important question then, is not whether
zoning laws are efficient in promoting the construction and maintenance of
exclusive neighborhoods, but rather to whom, and why, such living
environments are perceived as beneficial.
have vested rights in the existing zoning classification. See, for example, the discussion in Stone v. City
of Wilton, 331 N.W.2d 398 (Iowa 1983). Vested rights are established when it can be shown that the
owner had reasonable investment backed expectations that the zoning ordinance would not be changed.
An interference with such expectations constitutes a taking. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
175 (1979). In the reverse case, neighbors may be successful in portraying an amendment to the zoning
ordinance lifting a development restriction formerly placed on a specific parcel as an instance of illegal
"spot zoning." See 7 PATRICK ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 38A.01 (1978). In addition,
even when such a move is legally possible, it is extremely difficult to undo residential zoning schemes
given the realities of municipal politics. In the words of a property owner from Greenwich, Connecticut,
who could not get permission to change the use of his land from residential to commercial, in his town
"no one can get elected unless he swears on the Bible, under the tree at midnight, and with a blood oath
to uphold zoning." Ralph Blumenthal, Pressures of Growth Stir Zoning Battles in Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES,
May 29, 1967, at Al, A13 (quoted in TOLL, supra note 8, at 296).
112. M. CHRISTINE BOYER, DREAMING THE RATIONAL CITY: THE MYTH OF AMERICAN CITY
PLANNING 148, 156 (1983).
113. Kennedy, supra note 110, at 89. For the advantages zoning presented in the 1920s over a
nuisance-based system of land use law, see Andrew A. Lundgren, Beyond Zoning: Dynamic Land Use
Planning in the Age ofSprawl, 11 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 101, 125-26 (2004).
114. For an elaborate economic analysis of the costs and benefits associated with different
forms of land use regulation, including zoning, see Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning:
Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681 (1973).
115. See CONSTANCE PERIN, BELONGING IN AMERICA: READING BETWEEN THE LINES 81-128
(1988) (arguing that homeownership in a "nice" neighborhood is often perceived as the top rung in the
long climb up the ladder of life).
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Exclusive neighborhoods were extremely appealing to the middle classes
when Euclid was decided. They still are today. This appeal can be attributed to
domesticity ideals, which focus on separating the unnatural, hectic work sphere
from the home sphere that is envisioned as a quiet haven. Domesticity ideals
flourished during the nineteenth century and continued to influence the way
people understood their surrounding world in the early twentieth century. These
ideals shaped reformers' schemes for bettering that world. At least originally,
domesticity ideals were based on gendered notions: the market world was seen
as the exclusive province of men; home and family were deemed the special
province of women.11 7 As an outcome of these concerns, the legal reform
movement of the time made the middle-class home "the focus, even the issue
itself . . .. Business was allowed full play in the factory, but the market was
highly regulated when it touched the home."' 18
The legal protection of the single-family residences neighborhood clearly
corresponds to this pattern. True, it must be acknowledged that Justice
Sutherland's thinking and reasoning in Euclid cannot easily be dispensed with
as gender-biased. As a Republican Senator from Utah, Sutherland sponsored
the Nineteenth Amendment guaranteeing women's suffrage. Perhaps even
more importantly, shortly after he joined the Court, he authored the Adkins
majority opinion, striking down a statute setting minimum wages for women.
Justice Sutherland thus dismissed the idea that women should receive any
special protective treatment due to their sex.1 19 At the very least, that decision
shows that gender bias alone could not displace his basic anti-regulatory
instincts. This does not mean, however, that the desire to isolate the middle-
class home sphere and its inhabitants from risk and commotion was irrelevant
to the adoption of zoning. While Sutherland might not have been anxious to
create a safe environment for women, he was very much concerned with
providing such an atmosphere for children. He thus frets in Euclid about the
116. Lees, supra note 99, at 415-20; Stahl, supra note 46, at 1245-51. The lawyers
representing the Village of Euclid indeed tried to portray the village as protecting the American home.
Brooks, supra note 17, at 6-7, 23.
117. For more on the dichotomy between the market sphere and the family sphere, see Frances
E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497,
1498-1501, 1563-67 (1983).
118. THOMAS BENDER, A NATION AMONG NATIONS: AMERICA'S PLACE IN WORLD HISTORY
278-80 (2006).
119. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923) ("We cannot accept the doctrine
that women of mature age, sui juris, require or may be subjected to restrictions upon their liberty of
contract which could not lawfully be imposed in the case of men under similar circumstances. To do so
would be to ignore all the implications to be drawn from the present day trend of legislation, as well as
that of common thought and usage, by which woman is accorded emancipation from the old doctrine
that she must be given special protection or be subjected to special restraint in her contractual and civil
relationships."). A number of leading feminists at the time cited the decision as a progressive statement
regarding the equal rights of women. Randle, supra note 74, at 52-53. Sutherland's modern supporters
have relied on this aspect of his Adkins opinion to justify a decision that lies in disrepute. See, e.g.,
ARKES, supra note 19, at 13-14.
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damage suffered by children deprived "of the privilege of quiet and open
spaces for play."l 20
According to the cult of domesticity, children were to be sequestered in
the safe home sphere. Middle-class children were to be kept away from
"harm's way." Harm's way often meant contact with the poor or minority
cultures.121 This was-and remains-a key issue. Domesticity ideals fixated the
middle classes on exclusive neighborhoods. Yet, exclusivity referred not only
to the spatial and architectural attributes of the neighborhood, but also to its
social qualities. Not only were certain buildings and activities to be kept out of
the home sphere, but certain sorts of people were also to remain on the outside.
Zoning fed the American appetite for income segregation.1 2 2 In addition, it had
clear racial overtones. In this context, there is another piece of legal history to
consider if the puzzle that is the Euclid decision is to be solved.
Nine years before the Euclid decision, the Court ruled in Buchanan v.
Warley that a municipal ordinance establishing exclusively white residential
areas was unconstitutional.123 The Buchanan decision blocked the direct route
to residential segregation. Zoning, however, enabled municipalities to pursue
the same segregationist goals indirectly.124 Cities could not legally zone out
minority residents, but they could zone out affordable housing. Given the
correlation between race and class in America, such measures effectively
limited minorities' access to the zoned areas. Zoning thus fits the "possessive
investment in whiteness" framework suggested by George Lipsitz.125 Zoning
laws allowed the beneficiaries of past discrimination to keep reaping its
material advantages even after an anti-discrimination measure had been
adopted by the Court. They enabled the value of whiteness, in this case
represented by higher home values in exclusive suburbs, to persist. White
homeowners were, thereby, able to protect their gains and pass them on to
succeeding generations.
120. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926).
121. Richard H. Chused, Euclid's Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 612-14
(2001).
122. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 555 (3d ed. 2005); Eliza Hall,
Note, Divide and Sprawl, Decline and Fall: A Comparative Critique ofEuclidean Zoning, 68 U. PITT. L.
REV. 915, 923-25 (2007).
123. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
124. The same goals could be achieved by participants in the real estate market by using the
tools of private law. Until the landmark decision of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), racially
restrictive covenants, upheld by the Court the same year in which Euclid was handed down in Corrigan
v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926), were constitutional and common. It should also be noted that several
municipalities adopted explicitly racial zoning ordinances even after the Court found them to be illegal.
Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to Protective Zoning in Low-
Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 749-50 (1993).
125. GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: HOw WHITE PEOPLE
PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS 33 (rev. ed. 2006).
119
Yale Journal on Regulation
Therefore, zoning was, as Lawrence Friedman argues, "a restriction on
property rights; but for the benefit of the middle-class mass."1 26 The Court,
under the patrician leadership of Chief Justice Taft, was in its composition an
establishment of the ruling elite,127 and its Euclid decision had clear racial and
class connotations. The ruling can consequently be construed as aiming to help
the middle classes live their bourgeois utopia by excluding the lower classes-
and particularly, minorities-from their turf.12 8 Thus understood, Euclid sowed
the seeds for exclusionary zoning. Today, it is clear that while zoning laws
were often presented, as they were in Euclid, as tools for spatial engineering,
they have developed and functioned to a great extent as measures of social
engineering. They have been employed to control not just the environment, but
community composition as well. 129
It is hard to claim that the Euclid Court could not have foreseen this
eventuality. By the mid-1920s, it had become clear that zoning's raison d'tre
was the promotion of social homogeneity in residential districts.1 3 0
Contemporary commentators, academics, lawyers, and even judges,
progressive and conservative alike, had already exposed this prospect.1 3 1
Furthermore, the lower court deciding Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid
had also found zoning laws to constitute a taking of property without just
compensation specifically because they classified and segregated the
population along race and income lines.132
3. The Lochner Jurisprudence and "Class" Legislation
The Supreme Court reversed the decision without addressing this forceful
argument upon which the district court's conclusion was based. Presumably, as
those scholars who perceive zoning laws as being little more than the fruit of
middle-class interests would argue, the Court found no issue with such
classification and segregation, since it served the dominant classes in U.S.
society. Still, when phrased solely in terms of tangible class benefits, even this
explanation of Euclid is lacking. It can arguably explain why conservative
126. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 401 (2002).
127. Seven of the Justices were well-educated sons of upper-class Protestants of old American
stock. Even the two exceptions were very much part of the social elite: Justice Brandeis was a member
of the German-Jewish aristocracy, and Justice Sutherland, though originally a poor Mormon immigrant,
was by this time a parvenu plutocrat. Garrett Power, Advocates at Cross-Purposes: The Briefs on Behalf
ofZoning in the Supreme Court, 21 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 88 (1997).
128. See Chused, supra note 121, at 604-15; Randle, supra note 74, at 40-43; Wolf, supra note
26, at 253-59.
129. See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT
BUILDING WALLS 144-45 (1999); Gregory J. Richards, Zoning for Direct Social Control, 1982 DUKE
L.J. 761, 762-67, 777-78, 806-07.
130. TOLL, supra note 8, at 196-97.
131. Id. at 259-62; Lees, supra note 99, at 380-92.
132. 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924).
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Justices supported zoning,133 but not why progressive Justices (namely,
Brandeis and Stone) concurred. Furthermore, it is hard to square such an
account with the Court's commitment in that era to the principle of neutrality in
government. The Lochner Court's jurisprudence was steered by the legal
dogma that an exercise of the government's police power is only legitimate
when it serves the general public welfare. As noted in Section I.B, a regulation
adopted merely for the sake of the well-being of a specific set of citizens, of
one class of individuals, was, according to this legal guideline, in violation of
substantive due process. Clearly, in an age of progressive legislative reform,
such a judicial attitude was prone to harm the lower classes disproportionately.
Nonetheless, the Lochner Court tended to be true to its abhorrence of "class" or
"special" legislation, no matter which class benefitted from the legislation.134 It
is, therefore, not easy to imagine the Court so blatantly serving the tangible
interests of the middle classes in Euclid in defiance of its own jurisprudence
and legal philosophy.
The Court, we should also remember, refused to recognize these interests
as a permissible basis for state action when it decided the fate of expressly
racial zoning. In Buchanan v. Warley, a Louisville ordinance making it
unlawful for a black person to reside in a block where a majority of the houses
were occupied by whites (and vice versa) was struck down, but not because it
denied the black buyer (who could not move in) the equal protection of the
laws. Instead, the Court focused on the interference with the property right of
the white seller, whose freedom to contract with the black buyer and thereby
alienate his land was, as Justice Day explained, restricted in violation of the
Due Process Clause.' 35  The ordinance reviewed in Euclid was treated
differently, and was allowed to further, again at the expense of an owner's
freedom, the same class interests the Court refused to acknowledge as
legitimate grounds in Buchanan. The Euclid zoning ordinance thus must have
been perceived as promoting an additional public interest, one that was, at least
133. Chused, supra note 121, at 597-98.
134. GILLMAN, supra note 97, at 1-18, 46, 103, 125, 127; see also BARRY CUSHMAN,
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 139 (1998).
135. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 73, 82 (1917). The petitioner in the case was the white
seller of a house, who sought to enforce the contract of sale on the defendant, the black buyer (the head
of the local NAACP branch), who argued that because of the racial ordinance he could not legally
perform the contract. The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, relying on substantive due process. It
therefore did not reach the alternative basis for the petition-the Takings Clause. Thus, the decisions in
Euclid and Buchanan were based on different legal provisions. The analysis was, however, inevitably,
almost identical: under both the Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause; for the municipality to win,
it must have been able to show that the regulation was a legitimate exercise of the police power. The
difference between the clauses, as the law stood at that early time, would have only become relevant if
the municipality had failed to meet this task. Under substantive due process analysis, the regulation is
then voided. Under takings analysis, the municipality is then forced to pay just compensation (or
voluntarily renounce the ordinance). For more on the Buchanan decision, see, for example, James W.
Ely, Jr., Reflections on Buchanan v. Warley, Property Rights, and Race, 51 VAND. L. REV. 953 (1998);
and Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 881, 934-44
(1998).
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seemingly, class neutral. According to Buchanan, the mere desire to preserve
residential segregation, even if it benefitted a large class of citizens, could not
justify an exercise of the police power that limited the freedom of an owner to
use or sell her land as she saw fit. That was the legal principle to which the
district court adhered when it ruled against the Village of Euclid.
But the Supreme Court apparently believed that the lower court failed to
identify accurately the purpose of the residential zoning regulation. It overruled
the district court's decision because it was of the view that this specific use of
the police power could be justified as advancing the general public welfare, and
not the interest of just one class of citizens. But how? What allowed zoning to
be perceived as transcending its function in serving the middle classes? What
made it more than just bourgeois? What made it American?
III. An Alternative Account: Zoning as a Means to Promote a Reimagined
Jeffersonian Populist Conception of Property
Section II.A of this Article showed how Euclid could be perceived as the
Court's reaction to urban change. Section II.B illustrated the ways in which
Euclid served middle-class interests. Both Sections, however, concluded that
neither account can fully explain the decision. Euclid does not merely typify
legal flexibility when confronting real world change, nor does it simply stand
for intransigent judicial adherence to the wishes of the middle classes. In this
Part, I will present what I believe to be the lynchpin that binds these two
explanations together. I will attribute the result of Euclid to a traditional
American commitment to the redeeming qualities of ownership and the
necessity to construct a society based on a certain form of property distribution,
as adjusted to the circumstances of the modem age.
A. The Jeffersonian-Jacksonian Surge in the Progressive Era: "Old
Progressives" and "Old Conservatives"
To best comprehend the U.S. property tradition in its Progressive Era
embodiment, it is helpful to begin the discussion not with Justice Sutherland,
but with Justice Brandeis, his ideological nemesis on the Court, who in this
case opted to join Sutherland's majority opinion. Justice Brandeis represents an
important strand in U.S. political and legal thought. The man behind Woodrow
Wilson's "New Freedom," he personified "old progressivism"-a
progressivism still attached to Jeffersonian and Jacksonian ideals.13 Old
progressivism, in its belief in the capacity of each and every American to
compete and succeed independently if only assured a fair playing field, differed
136. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 224 (1955). On
Brandeis as the chief architect of Wilson's "New Freedom," see ARTHUR S. LINK, WILSON: THE ROAD
TO THE WHtTE HOUSE 488-92 (1947).
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from "new progressivism." The two forms of progressivism were most
prominently at odds in their respective attitudes toward governmental
regulation. While old progressivism called for a government whose role was
limited to restoring competition to the market-that is to say, to removing
barriers placed by the modem corporate economy in the way of the ambitious
citizen-new progressivism wholeheartedly embraced administrative
management. It advocated a strong government comprehensively employing
regulatory powers, which it saw as vital in a new reality teeming with strong
players who were not going to disappear. In such a world, new progressives
believed that the common man lacked the power to stand up for himself
independently. In their view, it was nafve to believe that it could be otherwise,
to hope as old progressives did that a long-lost past could somehow be restored.
The two competing progressive variants clashed most famously in the
presidential election of 1912, when Woodrow Wilson, campaigning under the
banner of "New Freedom," defeated Theodore Roosevelt, the champion of
"new progressivism," or, as he dubbed it, "New Nationalism."' 3 7
In its suspicion of expansive regulation enforced from above, and in its
conviction that big market players can and should be broken up by legal action,
old progressivism shared much with the "old conservatism" that characterized
the Lochner Court. Over the past few decades legal historians have repudiated
the long-held belief that the Lochner Court was pro-big business ("new
conservative"). As they show, the Lochner Court's abhorrence for regulation
and redistribution was not an answer to the interests and needs of the newly
consolidated major business interests. In actuality, the Court was adhering to
old Jacksonian notions regarding the natural power of small independent
businesses and the danger inherent not only to large-scale government, but also
to large-scale private enterprises.'3 8
B. Zoning as a Jeffersonian-Jacksonian Scheme of Regulation
This ideological positioning enabled conservatives and progressives-old
conservatives and old progressives-to find common ground when considering
zoning. At first blush, zoning is the archetype of new progressivism, of central
regulation introduced in order to deal with the irreversible interdependence of
137. For a discussion of the relationship between the "New Freedom" and the "New
Nationalism," see, for example, JAMES CHACE, 1912: WILSON, ROOSEVELT, TAFT & DEBS: THE
ELECTION THAT CHANGED THE COUNTRY 192-97, 203 (2004). On the relative impact of the two
progressive ideologies on the eventual New Deal, see ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF
ROOSEVELT VOLUME III: THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 385-408 (1960).
138. HORWITZ, supra note 57, at 7, 86; see also CUSHMAN, supra note 134, at 139; GILLMAN,
supra note 97, at 1-18, 61-62. On the attitude of Jeffersonians and especially Jacksonians to
consolidation and competition, see ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 334-41
(1945); and Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J.
1593, 1610-12 (1988). This attitude was most famously exemplified in the seminal decision of Charles
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
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modem life. But zoning is much more than that. In essence, and as already
seen, it is a tool for assuring the survival (and eventual entrenchment) of a
chosen way of life. Zoning, in its American interpretation, protects the small
homeowner, freeing her from the specter of big business-in the form of
industry, commerce, or apartment building development-moving in on her.
Zoning thus promotes the aspiration for residential areas comprising many
"independent" homeowners living on their own land.139
This image of the small homeowner corresponds to the ingrained
Jeffersonian vision of the independent yeoman.140 Thomas Jefferson was
convinced that the yeoman's economic self-reliance assured his freedom and
political autonomy. Hence, increasing the number of American yeomen
strengthened the national capacity for self-determination. Accordingly, old
conservatives and old progressives both viewed the proliferation of small
landholding as a bulwark of democracy. Loyal to Jefferson's worldview, they
saw in the small owner the promise of a thriving civic society and a healthy
economic market, constructed on a robust foundation of an independent, active,
and involved citizenry. Residential zoning, which insulated the esteemed
independent owner from new urban threats, could thus enjoy the imprimatur of
Jefferson. The suburbanite was the modern yeoman; protecting her meant
protecting the republic.
Residential zoning not only realized the Jeffersonian vision, but it also
bore a striking resemblance to Jefferson's own scheme for the fulfillment of
that ideal. In fact, zoning perfected his early plan by solving the temporal
handicap that always plagued Jeffersonianism. In 1784, Jefferson headed a
committee of the Confederation Congress dealing with the methods by which
lands in the Old Northwest (the area between the Mississippi and Ohio rivers)
would be surveyed and sold to settlers. The ordinance he proposed was to
divide the land, regardless of terrain, by means of a rigid grid, consisting of
units of equal size that would be sold to individual farmers.141 While this plan
aimed at constructing yeomen communities and could have created them for
the short-term, it could not have assured the maintenance of such communities:
settlers could become speculators, aggregating units or putting them to uses
conflicting with those desired by Jefferson and the other planners. Modem
139. LEO MARX, THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN: TECHNOLOGY AND THE PASTORAL IDEAL IN
AMERICA 128 (35th anniversary ed. 2000).
140. On the yeoman's key role in Jefferson's view of democracy, see WILENTZ, supra note 36,
at 47-48; and Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Private Property in Revolutionary
America, 19 J. L. & ECON. 467, 470-74, 480-81 (1976).
141. The Confederation Congress adopted the land ordinance in May 1785. While the grid of
Jefferson's plan was retained, the size of the units was changed. Heeding the protests of the New
Englanders, who warned of fragmentation, the basic units were to be townships six miles square,
subdivided into sections one mile square. The provisions for sale benefitted land speculators, rather than
settlers. By this time, Congress was above all concerned with raising funds from the sale of the lands in
order to deal with a crippling national debt. See Reginald Horsman, The Northwest Ordinance and the
Shaping ofan Expanding Republic, WIS. MAG. HIST. 21, 26-27 (1989).
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residential zoning was an improvement on this practice: it not only reincarnated
Jefferson's Northwestern land policy, with all its rigidity and emphasis on
small individual lots, but also promised to create communities that would
transcend the original's ephemeral nature. Unlike the yeoman of old, the new
suburbanite will not become a land speculator in due course;142 zoning laws
will make sure that she will not be able to convert her land into more lucrative
uses such as retail or apartment buildings.143  The modem residential
neighborhood thus appeared as the new and improved means of promoting
Jefferson's vision of a republican empire.
Related tenets of Jacksonianism similarly vouched for zoning.
Jacksonians, such as the old conservatives and old progressives on the Court,
always firmly believed in the power of competition among many small- and
medium-sized players. Bigness, in their worldview, was both unnatural and
dangerous. It was the product not of initiative and economies of scale, but of
the ability of those enjoying political and economic prominence to game the
system to the detriment of the honest common man and of the welfare of
society at large. Once achieved, such bigness undermined local political and
economic independence. 1" Applied to housing patterns, this stance endorsed a
residential neighborhood consisting of many small single-family homes as
142. On the yeoman becoming a speculator, and on how, following the first decades of the
nineteenth century, American rural society ended up attached not to land but to land values, see
HOFSTADTER, supra note 136, at 40-42, 46.
143. The temporal dilemma that supposedly plagues any plan of land reform was a main
argument of Robert Nozick, who claimed that a principle promising property for all would early on be
frustrated by the owners' right to transfer their property. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND
UTOPIA 160-63 (1974). Jeremy Waldron's reply to Nozick is that limitations on the ability to transfer
property can prevent this result. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 423-25 (1988).
Zoning fulfilled this exact function. Interestingly enough, some prominent commentators at the time
failed to realize this potential of zoning. Ernst Freund argued that zoning, while promising in Europe,
was inappropriate for the United States. The main reason he cited was that urban spaces in America,
unlike their counterparts in Europe, were in constant flux since local districts kept changing. Zoning, so
he argued, could not fit into this built environment, based on a particular national psyche.
[Therefore the] illusion that zoning can fix the character of neighborhoods in permanence
should not be entertained. If zoning can produce the standard of stability that is characteristic
of cities in older countries, it will render a valuable service, but more than that can hardly be
expected, and even such stability will mean a change in the national temperament which at
present combines the lowest degree of local attachment with the highest degree of
sensitiveness as to neighborhood associations.
Ernst Freund, Some Inadequately Discussed Problems of the Law of City Planning and Zoning, in
PLANNING PROBLEMS OF TOWN, CITY AND REGION 79, 91 (1929). While zoning cannot assure absolute
stability-and thus, for example, even some first-ring suburbs have not been immune to cycles of
decline and gentrification-it is undeniable that on the whole, zoning has allowed for the persistence of
certain patterns of development in certain locations.
144. Louis D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF Louis D.
BRANDEIS (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1934); see, e.g., NELSON LLOYD DAWSON, Louis D. BRANDEIS,
FELIX FRANKFURTER, AND THE NEW DEAL 14-17, 21, 24 (1980); Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain
Store Movement, Localist Ideology, and the Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920-1940, 90
IOWA L. REV. 1011 (2005).
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opposed to mammoth apartment buildings. It is no coincidence that Justice
Sutherland referred in his decision to the danger of apartment buildings
"monopolizing" residential areas;145 monopoly, as the antonym of small
competing actors, was the Progressive Era's obsession.146
Physically, the big apartment building-no less than the factory or
department store-represented a modern mechanical intrusion into an imagined
pastoral environment, as made evident in the passage from Justice Sutherland's
opinion quoted in Section II.B. The apartment building struck Justice
Sutherland and his contemporaries as something of a Machine in the Garden, to
apply Leo Marx's celebrated metaphor. Marx demonstrated that the pastoral
ideal has defined the meaning of America ever since its discovery and still
dominates the national imagination.14 7 As others have shown, the affinity for
the rural was very much on the minds of Americans in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.148 Jerry Frug has argued that Sutherland's (as well as
others') support of local zoning was "articulated in the anti-urban language of
sentimental pastoralism."1 49 Apartment buildings became the epitome of
urbanism, and thus, they aroused the American (and English) anti-urbanist
instinct of which Jeffersonianism is a clear manifestation.' 50
In spurring this antagonism toward multi-family houses, the form and size
of the buildings played a major role, but these were not the sole-or even
main-culprits. After all, if the concern regarded solely the height and bulk of
apartment buildings, then using height and density regulations to mandate
adjustment in these characteristics of the structures would have been the
answer-not exclusion.' 5 But the aversion to apartment buildings ran deeper:
when imagining an apartment house, the Euclid Justices and other Americans
145. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926).
146. Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REV. AM. HIST. 113, 123-24 (1982).
The spirit of the times was made apparent in President Wilson's presentation of the Clayton Act of 1914.
The Act sought, as he explained "to destroy monopoly and maintain competition as the only effectual
instrument of business liberty," so as to "make men in a small way of business as free to succeed as men
in a big way and to kill monopoly in its seed." Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the
Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1518 (1984)
(quoting Letter from President Woodrow Wilson to Rep. Oscar W. Underwood (Oct. 17, 1914),
reprinted in 51 CONG. REC. app. 1187 (1914)). Similarly illustrative is a somewhat later argument made
by a legal commentator: "Unless we destroy monopoly, monopoly will find ways to destroy most of our
reforms and, in the end, lower the standards of our common life." Homer Cummings, The Unsolved
Problem of Monopoly, 72 U.S. L. REV. 23,23 (1938).
147. MARX, supra note 139, at 3-11.
148. WARNER, supra note I10, at 11-14, 89, 153-54.
149. Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1082 (1996); see also
Lees, supra note 99, at 421-24.
150. JACKSON, supra note 44, at 68-72. Jefferson and Madison believed that urban life would
sap the manly independence of the republic's citizens. JACK N. RAKOVE, JAMES MADISON AND THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 162 (2d ed. 2002). See generally MORTON G. WHITE & LUCIA
WHITE, THE INTELLECTUAL VERSUS THE CITY: FROM THOMAS JEFFERSON TO FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT
(1962) (discussing the persistence of anti-urbanism in the works of American thinkers).
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pictured a Lower East Side tenement, and not, for example, the elegant
buildings of Paris's boulevards.
It is easy to forget that until the 1960s the condominium as a form of
ownership, established in Europe for centuries, was unknown in the United
States (the cooperative did arrive earlier, but never gained much popularity).152
This meant that up to that time, in America, residents of apartment buildings,
almost by definition, were renters. Since fee ownership could not, at least in
practice, be vertically divided, separate ownership of individual apartments was
practically unattainable.' 53 Legally unable to own the discrete units in the
building, residents had to lease them from the owner of the building. Thus, they
were always tenants, and a tenant is the antipode of the independent owner. A
tenant is dependent on her landlord, and consequently, cannot perform her role
as a free citizen in a democracy and a market economy. In the words of Salmon
Chase, a member of President Abraham Lincoln's cabinet and a Supreme Court
Justice, a liberal nation is marked by "freedom not serfdom; freeholds not
tenancy; democracy not despotism; education not ignorance."' 5 4
Chase was recasting the Jeffersonian ideal, to which tenancy was
antithetical. Alarmingly, however, by the early twentieth century, the
traditional remedy prescribed by Jeffersonians to the politically emasculating
tenancy relationship was quickly becoming obsolete. The anachronistic
prescription of yeomanry as a cure-all for the urban malaise was patently
ineffective. It was pointless to hope that the apartment-dwelling masses could
move to the country and own rural lands, and futile to adopt property law
standards that would actively encourage them to do so. There were no more
152. EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF
RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 94-96 (1994). In a condominium, each buyer owns her unit (while
the common property is owned in common by all owners). The cooperative (co-op), on the other hand, is
not based on the fee simple ownership model. In a cooperative, the entire building is owned by a
corporation, of which the residents are shareholders and from which they lease their units. Co-ops
arrived on the American scene much earlier than the condominiums did: in 1880 in New York, Philip G.
Hubert, a French dmigr6 architect, organized the first co-op, to serve "gentlemen of congenial tastes, and
occupying the same social positions in life." EDWIN G. BURROWS & MIKE WALLACE, GOTHAM: A
HISTORY OF NEW YORK CITY TO 1898, at 1078 (1999). Ever since, the co-op has mostly served that
small class of Manhattanites.
153. The common law's estate system does not recognize the condominium. In theory, it
might be possible to create a "common law condominium" by utilizing other existing property forms.
There is, however, some doubt whether the necessary preliminary move-the carving up of air space
into separate units and the conveyance of such units in fee-is allowable. Even if it is, and though many
of the issues pertaining to the government of the condominium could be settled by complex
arrangements relying on such recognized interests as tenancies in common, determinable fees, and
covenants, major issues remain. Therefore, the solution must be sought outside of the common law, and
in practice, condominiums did not emerge until the 1960s, when virtually all the states adopted statutes
expressly authorizing the creation of condominiums. This move followed the National Housing Act of
1961, which made federal insurance available for condominiums, provided they have the sanction of
state law. The first such law was adopted three years earlier by Puerto Rico. See, e.g., Curtis J. Berger,
Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 987, 1001-04 (1963); Jan Z.
Krasnowiecki, The Pennsylvania Uniform Planned Community Act, 106 DICK. L. REV. 463, 474-77
(2002).
154. BENDER, supra note 118, at 125 (emphasis added).
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"unsettled" lands to the west that could serve as a safety valve or as breeding
grounds for the new yeoman. The 1890 United States Census stated that the
frontier had ceased to exist, and, as Frederick Jackson Turner famously
announced three years later at the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago,
America had changed forever.' 55 Nor did existing rural communities present
much promise for salvaging the independence of the tenement dwellers.
Industrialization was in full swing, while agriculture was mired in a deep and
miserable depression. 156 "By 1920, for the first time in the nation's history, a
majority of Americans were city dwellers. In the following decade, some six
million more American farmers quit the land and moved to the city." 5 7 It was
obvious that the future was in the constantly expanding metropolitan areas, not
in the farmlands that were being drained of their inhabitants. The urban tenant
was as threatening to democracy as ever, but the rural yeoman could no longer
serve as an opposing ideal.
Its closest approximation, however, was readily available. Leaving the
countryside did not necessarily suggest moving into the central city. By the end
of the 1920s, nearly a third of the metropolitan population lived outside the
central city.1ss Removed from the bustling city center, the suburb with its
closed community comprising single-family resident-owned houses, at least
superficially, restored the yeoman ideal. 159  Like Jefferson's yeomen
community, the residential district of detached houses consists of independent
individuals minding their own business but also cooperating in their efforts to
lead happier lives. As owners of their own land, the residents are free from the
yoke of landlords-unlike the residents of apartment buildings. Therefore, they
can participate in local politics, speaking in their own authentic voices, and not
merely serving as conduits for powerful lords who wield control of their homes
to dictate their political behavior. As a result, the suburb is conceptually a
genuinely republican community of civic-minded and benevolent residents,
governed by the people, and not by an overbearing class of landlords.
Indeed, the suburb was, and still is, a fantasy of such a community. As
discussed in Section I.A, it is an image of a place much more than it is a real
place. It is usually nothing more than an "imaginary community," or as Frug
defines the neighborhood: "a fantasy community-a (comm)unity that is never
achievable."' 60 Suburbanites view themselves as members of a clearly defined
155. FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 27 (Frederick Ungar 1963) (1893). The paper was first presented before the American
Historical Association during the Exposition.
156. See, e.g., A. B. GENUNG, THE AGRICULTURAL DEPRESSION FOLLOWING WORLD WAR I
AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (1954).
157. DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION
AND WAR, 1929-1945, at 16 (1999).
158. TOLL, supra note 8, at 192.
159. See MUMFORD, supra note 104, at 500.
160. Jerry Frug, Decentralizing Decentralization, in AFTER IDENTITY: A READER IN LAW AND
CULTURE 165, 170 (Dan Danielson & Karen Engle eds., 1995).
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and close-knit community whose members share with them similar and august
attributes. In reality, the residents often have no contact with their neighbors
and supposed partners in the mythical autonomous community. In this sense,
the ideal of the suburb is similar to that of the nation, which is, in Benedict
Anderson's famed phrase, an "imagined community."' 6 1 The suburb is, as
Richard Sennett explained, a golden cage of an imagined purified identity and
community, reflective of an adolescent inability to endure ambiguity.1 But, if
truth be told, the same could be said of the Jeffersonian ideal; after all, it was a
yeomen community imagined from the plantation house atop Monticello.' 63
The image of a republican local community-in the early twentieth century just
as in the late eighteenth century-was always powerful yet largely fictitious.
C. A Comment on Jeffersonianism and Mortgaged Ownership
From the vantage point of our own troubled times, it is hard to ignore the
fact that the modem Jeffersonian Republican image is fictitious not only in its
depiction of the local community, but also in its portrayal of the independence
of the individual owner as well. The promised independence often appears
thwarted by the association of ownership with mortgages, and hence, an aside
about the relationship between the populist conception of ownership and debt
might be warranted. A debtor whose property is mortgaged must make regular
payments to her creditor. Like a tenant paying rent, if she fails to do so, she
might be forced out of her home. She may thus be seen as owner solely by title.
Moreover, in some jurisdictions she even fails to gain that formal distinction:
approximately ten states still retain today the traditional title theory of
mortgages, under which the mortgagee holds title to the property, and the
borrower-the resident "owner"--is solely the holder of an interest called the
equity of redemption.
This reality might cast doubt on the characterization of the owner as the
independent citizen celebrated by Jeffersonian political theory and Jacksonian
economic ideology. In fact, as early as in 1872 Friedrich Engels wrote that
161. BENEDICT R. O'G. ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN
AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (rev. ed. 1991). Anderson's thesis is that the nation is imaginary since its
members view themselves as related to one another, despite the obvious fact that they never met all their
"fellow" nationals and will never meet them in the fiture. Id. at 13-27.
162. RICHARD SENNETT, THE USES OF DISORDER 24-26, 36-38, 68-73 (1970).
163. Though Jefferson's agrarian ideal was sincere and reflected the way he wished to view
himself, it was detached from the reality of his life. He was not an independent yeoman toiling his land,
but a planter whose lands were worked by an army of approximately 200 slaves, and who was heavily
indebted to foreign creditors. JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 161-62, 171 (1996). Jefferson never really made the distinction between yeomen and
planters. See WILENTZ, supra note 36, at 47.
164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.1 (1997). The number is approximate
since the law is unclear in some of the states. The alternative theory, adhered to in most of the states, is
the lien theory, which grants the lender merely a lien on the property while the borrower retains title to
the property.
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homeownership frustrates, rather than promotes, the individual's autonomy. He
explained that the accompanying debt lessens the ability of the worker to sever
the ties tying her to her employer.165 The indebtedness associated with
ownership might very well betray the fictitious nature of the independence
supposedly assured by ownership. It might lead thoughtful observers to
question the logic behind the celebration of ownership, as it has done following
the most recent financial crisis. 166
But the point to be made here, in the context of the discussion of Euclid
and its embrace of the populist conception of property, is that there is nothing
new about this problem. The Jeffersonian yeoman was always-and not just in
her late twentieth century or early twenty-first century suburban Sun Belt
incarnation-much more independent in fantasy than in actuality. In real life,
more often than not, and throughout U.S. history, she has been saddled with
debt. Jefferson himself was not an independent yeoman but rather an indebted
planter.167 He was acutely aware of the ramifications of this predicament he
shared with many of Virginia's planters,' warning that as a result "the
planters were a species of property, annexed to certain mercantile houses in
London."l 69 Many were dismayed as the true yeomen, the supposedly
independent small farmers, were plagued by the same problem throughout the
ensuing century.17 0 In 1890, about 28% of owner farms in America were
mortgaged, and by 1920, the percentage had risen to more than 37%, while in
165. In criticizing the "bourgeois solution" to the housing problem, according to which
workers should become homeowners, Engels writes:
[P]oets live in a world of phantasy, and so do ... [these reformers], who imagine ... that a
landowner has "reached the highest .. . stage of economic independence," that he has "a
secure hold," that he has "become a capitalist and ... safeguarded against the dangers of
unemployment or incapacity to work, as a result of the real estate credit which would thereby
be open to him," etc. [They] should take a look at the French peasants and at our own small
peasants in the Rhineland; their houses and fields are loaded down with mortgages, their
harvests belong to their creditors before they are brought in, and it is not they who rule with
sovereign power on their "terrain" but the usurer, the lawyer and the bailiff. That certainly
represents the highest conceivable stage of economic independence-for the usurer! And in
order that the workers may bring their little houses as quickly as possible under the same
sovereignty of the usurer, our well-meaning [reformers] carefully point ... to the real estate
credit which they can make use of in times of unemployment or incapacity to work instead of
becoming a burden on the poor rate.
FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE HOUSING QUESTION 45-46 (Progress Publishers 1970) (1872).
166. See sources cited supra note 1.
167. KEvIN J. HAYES, THE ROAD TO MONTICELLO: THE LIFE AND MIND OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 100 (2008). See generally HERBERT E. SLOAN, PRINCIPLE AND INTEREST: THOMAS
JEFFERSON AND THE PROBLEM OF DEBT (1995) (discussing the strong objection to public debt that was a
key element of Jefferson's political thought, and its contrast to the reality of his own private debts).
168. Thus, for example, the estates of James Madison and James Monroe were also
encumbered with debts and mortgages. See RAKOVE, supra note 150, at 208; Gerard W. Gawalt, James
Monroe: Presidential Planter, 101 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 251, 254, 260 (1993).
169. Answers to Demeunier's Additional Queries (January-February 1786), in 10 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 27 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1950).
170. See, e.g., J. P. Dunn, Jr., The Mortgage Evil, 5 POL. SC. Q. 65 (1890).
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some Midwestern states it stood at well over 50%.171 The 1920s witnessed a
wave of farm foreclosures that devastated rural America.172
Even among the yeoman's suburban counterparts, chronic indebtedness is
not new. The nascent residential mortgage industry supposedly took off in the
1930s following the establishment of the Federal Housing Authority.173 But
even back in 1920, before the New Deal and before Euclid, the United States
Census reported that 40% of single-family, owner-occupied residences were
mortgaged. For the first time in U.S. history, in some sections of the country-
namely the Middle Atlantic and New England states-a preponderance of
mortgaged homes was shown.174 Compare these to the 2000 figure, which, for
the nation, stood at 70%."
For the duration of her American story, the owner has been saddled with
debt, and yet the power of ownership has not been meaningfully questioned.
The ability of jurists, policymakers, and laymen to overlook the fact that in
order to become owners individuals must assume debts that render them
anything but independent, is highly intriguing, but not novel. Coming to terms
with the fact that the owner was never going to be truly independent was an
inescapable compromise with modem society. In a commercially
interdependent society, a truly independent yeoman who did not meaningfully
interact with the outside market and was not dependent on goods and services
he could not produce for himself was a chimera. As already seen, by the early
twentieth century, the ideal of the yeoman had to be adjusted to urban realities
in order to be sustained, and thus the rural model owner was replaced by the
metropolitan one. Yet, the almost pre-social notion of the completely
independent yeoman had to be rewritten to meet the exigencies of living in a
commercial society. Thus, Jefferson could hail the independence of the yeoman
as his own debt kept ballooning, and settlers in the West could celebrate their
republican independence while Eastern credit was a lifeline to their existence.
Debt, like nonagricultural occupations, was anathema to the yeoman populist
conception of property in its purest form. Yet, from an early point, it was an
inevitable price to pay for the persistence of anything resembling that
conception.
Modem ownership came with a price tag that could undermine the same
independence that populist ownership was meant to serve. But jurists in the
1920s, just like policymakers later in the century, could downplay or ignore this
cost of ownership and still perceive of ownership as a form of landholding
171. The highest rate was found in North Dakota, where 71% of owned farms were
mortgaged. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1920 CENSUS 486.
172. KENNEDY, supra note 157, at 17.
173. For more on the Federal Housing Administration and its impact on the housing market,
see JACKSON, supra note 44, at 203-18.
174. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MORTGAGES ON HOMES 41 (1923).
175. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000: SUMMARY FILE 3 (SF-3), QT-H15, available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf3.pdf.
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inherently superior to tenancy. Credit was necessary for the proliferation of
ownership, and the populist conception of ownership was all about
proliferation.
D. The Inclusive Message ofJeffersonianism and of Zoning
The most vital attribute of the image of the closed community of owners,
whose undeniable appeal aids in concealing the image's fictitiousness and
costs, is that as a way of life that thrives on exclusion, the ownership society
can in theory be open to all. It is important to realize that the negative attitude
toward tenants in Euclid did not necessarily imply an attack on the lower
classes. This conclusion is the main reason why the class interests-based
explanation of Euclid, presented in Section II.B of this Article, is
unsatisfactory. It is too simplistic to accuse the Court of assuming "that
families unable to afford single-family homes were so undesirable that zoning
for the express purpose of keeping such families out of middle-class
neighborhoods was a reasonable government response."1 7 6 Such statements fail
to grasp the spirit of Jeffersonianism and of the Progressive Era-in both their
promise and prejudice.
A commitment to the values of private ownership and an attachment to the
virtues of property may entail not only a steadfast defense of owners but also a
cry for land reform. As Jeremy Waldron pointed out, if property is so good, if it
is an indispensable part of personality and human existence (in the Hegelian
tradition), then everybody should have it.177 This conviction was the core of
traditional republicanism, assuring that even though it was anachronistic in
musing on the merits of a disappearing agrarian society, Jeffersonianism was
not reactionary. If only tentatively, it always envisioned a redistribution of
property. Jefferson's draft of the Virginia Constitution, in which he sought to
provide fifty acres of land to each resident, and his faith in the redeeming role
of the West, where he believed that the agrarian idyll could regularly be
rediscovered by infinite generations of settlers working their own lands,
illustrated the progressive drive of the belief in the owner at the time.178 This
drive was indeed inherent to the logic of Jeffersonianism. As John Taylor, one
of Jefferson's truest disciples, succinctly explained: "[W]ealth, like suffrage,
must be considerably distributed, to sustain a democratick republic; and hence,
whatever draws a considerable proportion of either into a few hands, will
destroy it. As power follows wealth, the majority must have wealth or lose
power."l 79 Jefferson and his followers were committed to a planter's image of
176. Hall, supra note 122, at 924.
177. wALDRON, supra note 143, at 378, 408-15.
178. ELLIS, supra note 163, at 55 (discussing Jefferson's 1776 Virginia constitutional
proposal); Id. at 252 (concerning Jefferson's perception of the West).
179. JOHN TAYLOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES 274-75 (Yale Univ. Press 1950) (1814).
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ownership, to the view of land as related to lordship. But this commitment
engendered an aspiration that everyone shall become a lord-that everyone
should be an owner.
More than a century later, the Court's neo-Jeffersonian endorsement of
zoning was, similarly, not a mere attempt to protect suburban property holders
by keeping the poor out; it was an effort to expand the detached-residence
districts so that they could ultimately turn those members of the lower classes
into owners and house them. The Court sought to keep apartment buildings out,
in order, paradoxically, to allow their dwellers to eventually move in. Such a
policy originated in the belief, characteristic of the genteel reform spirit of the
day, that those less fortunate could someday adopt middle-class values and then
share in the bourgeois way of life.
A core component of the Progressive worldview was the conviction that
changing surroundings would change behavior. 80 The neighborhood consisting
solely of detached residences, the new middle-class heaven, presented a novel
and better environment eventually to be open to the working-class masses in
need of redemption from the squalid living conditions and moral decay of their
inner-city neighborhoods. The suburbs would allow immigrants to transcend
ethnic differences and antagonisms and become "whites" (as opposed to Anglo-
Protestants, Irish or Italian Catholics, and East European Jews, among others)
who could live near each other and intermarry with relatively little difficulty. 81
The promise of the residential neighborhoods, in the eyes of the Progressives,
was that they would enable poor immigrants of all (or rather, most) persuasions
to enjoy the material benefits of middle-class life, and hence, appreciate the
superiority of middle-class morals and espouse them. 182 They could serve as
"melting pots," exactly where the cities, ground down by the divisiveness and
corruption of their central administrations (the city "machines") and the
separatism of ethnic neighborhoods, had failed.18 3 As long as they lived as
tenants in the cities, the immigrants could never be independent, and their
ensuing state of wretched economic dependence threatened the democratic
process. It had them relying on city "machines," party bosses, and local
chieftains of the ethnic neighborhood, who provided apartments and jobs in
180. Chused, supra note 121, at 601.
181. LIPsITZ, supra note 125, at 7. For more on the "culture of unity" among European
Americans as it became dominant in the 1930s, see id. at 152-55.
182. ROY LUBOVE, THE URBAN COMMUNITY: HOUSING AND PLANNING IN THE PROGRESSIVE
ERA 56-58, 131-32 (1967).
183. The Progressives' hostile attitude toward city governments, headed as they were by
bosses relying on immigrant support was famously made apparent in SAMUEL ORTH, THE Boss AND
THE MACHINE (1919). For more on the Progressives' plans of Americanization, and on the ensuing
differences of opinion between the Progressives and the immigrants, especially with regards to this
domain of local democracy, see HOFSTADTER, supra note 136, at 180-86.
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return for votes and obedience. But once empowered by homeownership,
these same immigrants would shed their dependency on others and become
independent citizens who could contribute to the endurance of the American
republic. Quite simply, owning a single-family home would turn immigrants
into Americans.
As callow as this patrician belief might seem to many, and though it
contradicts modem notions of integration, it had some foundation in reality. In
his seminal study of the growth of suburban Boston around the turn of the
century, Sam Bass Warner found that:
[I]n one important way the suburbs served the half of Boston's population which
could not afford them. The apparent openness of the new residential quarters,
their ethnic variety, their extensive growth, and their wide range of prices....
[T]hese visible characteristics of the new suburbs gave aspiring low-income
families the certainty that should they earn enough money they too could possess
the comforts and symbols of success. Even for those excluded from them, the
suburbs offered a physical demonstration that the rewards of competitive
capitalism might be within reach of all. . . . Above all else the streetcar suburbs
stand as a monument to a society which wished to keep the rewards of capitalist
competition open to all its citizens. Despite ignorance and prejudice, during this
period of mass immigration, the suburbs remained open to all who could meet
the price.18 5
Later on, following World War II, mass suburbanization would allow
even the lower middle classes (as long as they were white) to meet the price
and partake in the single-family residence dream.186 Ownership of a single-
family residence was to trickle down, just like refinement had a century earlier,
from the upper classes to the middle and even lower classes, setting a new
dividing line between them and the underclasses left behind in the inner city.
Once more, in America, the badges and comforts of aristocracy were
theoretically made available to all.187
But for this to happen eventually, more neighborhoods of detached houses
first needed to be created and sustained. Zoning was indispensable for this
purpose. Zoning policies were accordingly not perceived as merely serving the
middle classes. Rather, they were viewed as allowing all members of society to
become middle-class. In this manner, we can account for the contrast,
highlighted in Section II.B, between the Court's opinion-which strikes
modem sensibilities as extremely biased and intolerant-and the Lochner
184. See, e.g., SONYA FORTHAL, COGWHEELS OF DEMOCRACY: A STUDY OF THE PRECINCT
CAPTAIN 57, 60-62 (1946); DAVID H. KURTZMAN, METHODS OF CONTROLLING VOTES IN PHILADELPHIA
(1935); JOHN T. SALTER, Boss RULE (1935).
185. WARNER, supra note 110, at 157, 160.
186. JACKSON, supra note 44, at 244-45.
187. This analysis is inspired by the study of refinement in America. See RICHARD L.
BUSHMAN, THE REFINEMENT OF AMERICA: PERSONS, HOUSES, CITIES 274-79, 421, 424-25 (1992).
134
Vol. 28.1, 2011
The Reinvention of Ownership
Court's jurisprudence, which rejected class legislation. The wording and result
of the opinion must be understood in light of the mindset of its authors and
contemporary readers; it is their ideas regarding equality and integration that
matter. When the Court explained how important it was to have regulations
safeguarding "the privilege of quiet and open spaces . .. enjoyed by those in
more favored localities,"'8 8 it was thinking not only of the privileged few
already enjoying the quiet and open spaces, but also of all those who might do
the same in the future. It was concerned with those in the less favored localities,
who, in the Court's genteel worldview, could improve their lot only if more
favored localities could be constructed and protected for their benefit. By
expanding the suburbs, zoning laws would promote the proliferation of
ownership, creating a more democratic nation in the true Jeffersonian vein.
Zoning, in the Court's estimation, served the general public welfare in the
clearest way possible: it enabled suburbanization to expand and fulfill the
American promise for all Americans.
E. The Appeal of the Populist Conception of Ownership
The populist conception of property is so irresistible precisely because it
can be understood by almost all-regardless of ideological disagreements-as
serving the general public welfare. Populist Jeffersonianism is appealing thanks
to its duality. On the one hand, it calls for the protection of property rights, but
on the other, it advocates their redistribution. It is egalitarian but reassuringly
nonradical. It attracts both those dedicated to the supremacy of property rights
and the market and those arguing for social reform. It allows jurists and
politicians to defend property rights on behalf of the propertyless. As seen in
Euclid, tenancy could be denied in order to serve the tenants. The populist
conception's appeal is thereby able to transcend time and ideology.
President Herbert Hoover once declared that:
To possess one's own home is the hope and ambition of almost every individual
in our country, whether he lives in a hotel, apartment, or tenement. . . . Those
immortal ballads, Home Sweet Home, My Old Kentucky Home, and The Little
Gray Home in the West, were not written about tenements or apartments ... they
189
never sing songs about a pile of rent receipts.
His rival and successor President Franklin Roosevelt claimed that when
the fulfillment of this dream is open to all, American democracy is fortified: "a
nation of homeowners, of people who won a real share in their own land, is
unconquerable."190 Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt, George W. Bush and
188. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926).
189. JACKSON, supra note 44, at 172.
190. Id. at 190. Democracy thereby becomes unbeatable since, as Roosevelt explained
elsewhere, landholding represses the proletarian psyche, thus averting any potential of revolution.
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Clinton,'9 ' Sutherland and Brandeis, could all wholeheartedly embrace the
populist conception of ownership. The conception might at times seem to lack
coherence, sophistication, or daring, but it always lacks a strict party affiliation.
That Justice Sutherland authored the Euclid decision approving of zoning
was thus not "a jurisprudential miracle." 9 2 Far from it. It is no surprise that
Justices, liberal and conservative, easily signed off on such a measure. The
dissenters, the three remaining conservative Horsemen, simply failed to realize
what their intellectual leader, Justice Sutherland,m who unlike them, was not
"a creature of impulse,"' 94 immediately grasped. Sutherland understood that
zoning was a new and revolutionary tool, requiring a departure from old legal
ideas; he also understood, however, that zoning was indispensable to the
survival of entrenched American values in a changing world.' 9 5
IV. Zoning and the Meaning of Property in the Progressive Era and Beyond
The Court accepted zoning because, at its core, it was a mechanism to
preserve Jeffersonian notions of property in a new age. What does this tale of
change and continuity, of reality and ideology, tell us about the
conceptualization of property in America in the twentieth century and about the
Court that introduced this new reading of ownership? The following and final
Sections of this Article will answer this pivotal question by focusing on the
modem legal concept of ownership as it emerged from Euclid.
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT VOLUME 111933-1935: THE COMING OF THE
NEW DEAL 320 (1958).
191. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
192. Timothy Alan Fluck, Euclid v. Ambler: A Retrospective, 52 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 326, 333
(1986).
193. On Justice Sutherland in relationship to the other Four Horsemen, see SCHLESINGER,
supra note 137, at 456-57 (quoting Reed Powell, who provided a rather derogatory description of the
Four Horsemen, in which Sutherland, though harshly criticized, is the only one of the four given credit
for something: his historical and legal intellect); and Burner, supra note 96, at 2133. See also CUSHMAN,
supra note 134, at 36. Barry Cushman further shows that Sutherland's record (especially as a U.S.
Senator) was far from all-out conservative. Note the difference between Cushman's portrayal of Justice
Sutherland and Arkes's, discussed supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. Though both aim at
redeeming his image, the first does so by painting him as less of a conservative than previously
assumed, while the second paints his conservatism in brighter colors. In another article, Cushman argues
that the same was true for the other conservatives on the Court. Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the
Four Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559 (1997).
194. PASCHAL, supra note 84, at 242-43 ("Had he been a creature of impulse, [Sutherland]
might well have joined Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter in rejecting the statute. It was a novelty
and its approval by the Court undoubtedly involved a recognition of a vast growth in political power.").
195. Another way of explaining the difference of opinion within the otherwise cohesive
conservative block is to focus on its members' attitudes toward state as opposed to federal regulation.
David Currie has argued that Justices Sutherland and Sanford were somewhat more tolerant of state
regulation than their colleagues, Justices McReynolds, Butler, and Van Devanter. David P. Currie, The
Constitution in the Supreme Court, 1921-1930, 1986 DUKE L.J. 65, 142-43. However, since these were
mere tendencies, and since much of the evidence for these supposed diverging approaches among the
conservatives is to be found in the votes placed in the Euclid case itself, the thesis's explanatory power
is very limited.
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A. Zoning: A Choice Between Property Rights
Most basically in Euclid, the Court realized that in an interdependent
urban environment, zoning did not present a clear-cut governmental threat to
private property. It understood that on both sides of the zoning conflict stood
property rights between which the policymaker must choose.' Zoning
damages the values of certain properties, but it does so to promote the values of
other properties. Ambler Realty's holdings took a hit when it was prevented
from selling the land to manufacturers or retailers. But at the same time, the
values of adjacent lands held by landowners who constructed (or planned to
construct) single-family residences were inflated. It cannot simply be said-as
Paschal argues-that Justice Sutherland authored a seemingly atypical decision
because "he saw in the zoning act not the deprivation of property, but its
enhancement."197 Similarly, and as Judge Westenhaver of the district court
noted, the ordinance could not be sustained solely "by invoking the average
reciprocity of advantage rule."1 98 The relevant regulation enhanced the value of
some properties, but in order to do so, it had to invade other properties. If
Sutherland, unlike his fellow conservative Justices, saw zoning as "inherently
more protective than destructive of property rights,"l99 it is only because he
chose to categorize some property rights as more worthy of protection than
others; it is only because he made a substantive judgment regarding the social
200role of constitutionally protected property rights.
For the same reason it is a mistake to claim, as A. Dan Tarlock does, that
the decision validated zoning in the abstract "with little appreciation of the
capricious distribution of burdens and benefits that result from how zoning
actually works." 20 1 The Court was acutely aware of the distributional effects of
its decision, which is why Richard Epstein is right but still misses the point
when he concludes that "[t]he efficiency of the zoning system was not
investigated by Justice Sutherland or, regrettably, by any Justices who have
196. This example is merely one instance of a broader phenomenon. The expansion of the
definition of property, see Part 1, is too often understood as foreshadowing conservative, or pro-private
property rulings (as these classifications are intuitively read). In fact, however, as the category of
interests deemed to be property grew, courts were forced to acknowledge the fact that property rights
conflicted with one another. Kainen, supra note 57, at 132-33.
197. PASCHAL, supra note 84, at 127. The distinction between regulations that invade property
and those that do not lessen its value was critical to the famous nineteenth-century jurist, Judge Cooley.
On Cooley's influence on Sutherland, see id. at 9, 15-20.
198. Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 315-16 (N.D. Ohio 1924); RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT: How To REVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE
PROPERTY 115-17 (2008).
199. Burner, supra note 96, at 2139.
200. In this sense, the decision reinforces Gregory Alexander's influential thesis that property,
while functioning as a commodity, also served at times as a means of creating desired social orders.
GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VIsIoNS OF PROPERTY IN
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970 (1997).
201. A. Dan Tarlock, Euclid Revisited, 34 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 4, 6 (1982).
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unthinkingly followed that fateful decision."202 The Court did not care about
the impact of zoning on overall social welfare defined in objective monetary
terms. It realized that one class of owners would pay dearly for its ruling,
perhaps even endure a loss greater than the reward the decision would grant to
another class of owners. The decision was about the distribution of benefits and
costs, not about their net value. The Court knew it had to choose whose
property (or, from another perspective, which property) should be protected; it
realized that it was faced with the question of who should reap zoning's
benefits at the expense of others-the industry developer and apartments'
builder or the subdivider and homeowner?
And the Court made its choice. It understood that unlike Pennsylvania
Coal, where, as discussed in Section I.B, a regulation was for the first time
deemed a taking, Euclid was not "the case of a single private house." 203 The
Euclid decision represented a national and historic choice between land uses. It
is thus reminiscent of another famous decision: the English case of Rylands v.
Fletcher,204 as interpreted by Francis Bohlen. The defendants there constructed
a reservoir to provide water for their mill. Eventually, water from the reservoir
flooded mines situated underneath adjacent land, owned by the plaintiffs. The
House of Lords held the defendants liable--despite the absence of
negligence-reasoning that the water escaped from an accumulation caused by
them for a "non-natural" use of land. Bohlen argues that the English lords
reached this result since the dominant class, to which the judges were attached
by either blood or aspiration, was the landed gentry, opposed to the rising
"commercial and artisan classes." 20 5 The landed gentry, Bohlen explains, had
202. Compare Richard A. Epstein, How To Create-or Destroy-Wealth in Real Property, 58
ALA. L. REv. 741, 759 (2007), with Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due
Process, 40 STAN. L. REv. 379, 445 (1988) (detecting in Euclid an adherence to an economic theory of
externalities).
203. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). The case dealt with the
challenge to a law that forced the petitioner, the owner of mining rights, to not undermine support for the
house built by the owner of the surface rights above. See supra Part 1. This is probably the best way of
explaining the different results in the two cases (recall that Euclid never mentioned Pennsylvania Coal).
It is more persuasive than the account put forward by Carol Rose. Rose has argued that Pennsylvania
Coal was unique in the Court's jurisprudence, standing out as the only case where a regulatory taking
was struck down, not because it represented 'too much' taking but [because of] the fact that the statute
transferred rights from one finite class of property owners to another." Carol M. Rose, Mahon
Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561, 581 (1984). But the act
contested in Euclid did the same. Just as the state law in Pennsylvania Coal transferred rights from the
mining companies to owners of the surface rights, zoning law transferred rights between owners of
commercial properties and owners of single-family residences.
204. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
205. Francis H. Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, 59 U. PA. L. REv. 298, 318-19, 339
(1910). For a rebuttal of Bohlen's argument that the judges were attached to the landed gentry, see
Robert Thomas Molloy, Fletcher v. Rylands: A Reexamination ofJuristic Origins, 9 U. CtI. L. REv. 266
(1942). For a modem account of the decision, also rejecting Bohlen's theory, see Jed Handelsman
Shugerman, The Floodgates of Strict Liability: Bursting Reservoirs and the Adoption of Fletcher v.
Rylands in the Gilded Age, 110 YALE L.J. 333 (2000).
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an interest in the protection of property as a sphere of total dominion, and in the
206
promotion of traditional uses of land over commercial ones.
The first part of Bohlen's final argument should be rephrased because it
ignores Bohlen's own basic insight that property rights are found on both sides
of the conflict.2 07 Yet, here he presents the dominion over property as referring
solely to security-that is, to the right of quiet enjoyment, of not having one's
land flooded-and not also to liberty of action-that is, to the right to use one's
land as one sees fit, to build a mill and reservoir on it.208 A more accurate
statement would be that the landed gentry sought to place the focus of property
rights on security, rather than on freedom. This emphasis on security relates to
the second part of Bohlen's thesis.
The House of Lords chose between legitimate uses of property rights. It
favored one group of uses, those deemed by it to be "natural" (traditional
homesteading, cultivating, and mining), over another group of uses, specifically
modem commercial utilization (for example, the construction of mills and
reservoirs). This choice was directed by a certain view of society, a view
demarcated by the landed gentry's preeminence.
Zoning, as explained in Section II.A, cannot be viewed as a direct
doctrinal offspring of the common law's property torts. However, and as stated
there, both bodies of law are tools for the regulation of land uses. Both define
the perimeters of property rights and thus whenever either is employed to settle
a controversy, a choice between property rights is involved. Therefore, the
following sentences Bohlen wrote with regard to the specific choice made in
Rylands, in the context of English tort law, could easily apply to the specific
choice made in Euclid in the context of U.S. property law:
[T]he determination of the proper exercise of rights whose extreme enjoyment
mutually interfere the one with the other, cannot be solved by any pre-existing
system of rules of law automatically applicable to each new situation. The
solution must depend upon the existing social, political and economic conditions
and conceptions prevailing at the particular time and in the particular place, the
traditional attitudes of mind and habit of thought, even the prejudices, of the
class then and there dominating public thought.
Just as the English lords were attached to the landed gentry's ideals, the
U.S. Supreme Court Justices were devoted to the ideals of those supporting the
new urban settings created by zoning.210 If Rylands saw the triumph of the
206. Bohlen, supra note 205, at 318-25.
207. Id. at 317-18.
208. For the same cause, his argument that Rylands was not accepted in the United States
since property rights in America were less absolute, is misguided. A more accurate description of the
idea of property in America can be found in the ensuing pages of this Article.
209. Bohlen, supra note 205, at 318.
210. See TOLL, supra note 8, at 253.
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English country house view of property, Euclid witnessed the victory of the
American suburban home view of property.
The Euclid Court chose suburban development over urban development
since the former was consistent with a certain ideal with which the Court-in
both its progressive and conservative quarters-could identify. As seen in Part
III, this ideal was not merely a class interest. It was, and still is, a constitutive
part of an American liberal tradition,211 but one read along strict traditional
terms. It is sensitive to patrician and gendered ideals of domesticity and
pastoralism, but is not limited to them, as it is a broader ideology of property
and democracy.212 While exclusive in effect, it is inclusive in aspiration.
B. How the Choice Made in Euclid ShouldAlter Our Understanding of the
Lochner Court
Partisan opponents in national politics and on the Court could agree on
extending preferential treatment to this form of landholding, and thus, they
could congregate around zoning.213 Promises of an ever-lasting Jeffersonian
Eden are hard to resist in America-no matter of what political persuasion is
the policymaker. This aspect of the analysis of Euclid shows that the labels
liberal and conservative-at least as applied to the Progressive Era and to
property policy-are simplistic. Similarly misleading is the traditional
portrayal, championed by the Progressive historians, of the Lochner Court as a
pawn of "the interests" in their oppression of "the people" on behalf of whom
the reformers were supposedly battling.214 Euclid exemplifies the fact that the
Court was in sync with the Progressive movement to a much higher degree than
traditional accounts hold. Still, this tentative conclusion is different from the
one promoted by most modem revisionist readings of the period. Revisionist
legal historians have tried to prove that the Court was much closer to the people
and more remote from the interests than had previously been assumed. 2 15 The
case of zoning demonstrates that the gap between the Court and the Progressive
movement might indeed not have been as wide as traditional Progressive
211. Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION 119-28 (1955).
212. Thus, while it is important to acknowledge the role of middle-class ideologies of
domesticity and pastoralism in the zoning struggle, as done by Lees, supra note 99, the discussion
cannot end there.
213. See supra Sections II.A & IILE.
214. For more, see Morton J. Horwitz, Progressive Legal Historiography, 63 OR. L. REv. 679
(1984).
215. For examples of such revisionist readings of the period, see CUSHMAN, supra note 134;
GILLMAN, supra note 97; HORWITZ, supra note 57; and MCCLOsKEY, supra note 13, at 91-120.
McCloskey also argues that it was the nation, not the Court, that was most responsible for the absence of
more effective social legislation at the time. Id. at 101-02; see also Melvin I. Urofsky, Myth and Reality:
The Supreme Court and Protective Legislation in the Progressive Era, in YEARBOOK OF THE SUPREME
COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY 53 (1983) (demonstrating that, in actuality, the Court upheld the vast
majority of regulations it put to substantive due process review).
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historiography would like us to believe-but for a reason contrary to the one
highlighted by the revisionists. The Court and the movement had a lot in
common because both were espousing, at least in some contexts, traditionalist
hegemonic notions.
Historians have followed Richard Hofstadter in stressing that the
Progressive movement was animated by both a spirit of reform and a spirit of
reaction;216 that it was not the radical, popular, working-class movement it
purported to be; that rather, it was a middle-class, genteel movement from
which immigrants were consistently excluded.21 At heart, the Populists and
Progressives attempted to "hold on to some of the values of agrarian life, to
save personal entrepreneurship and individual opportunity and the character
type they engendered, and to maintain a homogeneous Yankee civilization." 218
In the legal realm, however, even studies that aim at debunking the old
Progressive story of "the Court versus the People," remain attached to at least
some of the tenets of Progressive historiography, among them the
characterization of the Progressives as innovative liberal reformers.219 The
main reason for this failing is the almost exclusive focus placed on cases
220involving freedom of contract and substantive due process, the cause cdl~bre
of the Progressives. Examining the neglected component of the Court's
jurisprudence that is the Euclid decision allows us to make exploratory steps in
setting aside once and for all the outdated Progressive story. To make more
headway in this direction, a much more extensive examination of the Court's
jurisprudence is necessary. Unfortunately, such an endeavor is beyond the
scope of this Article. Nonetheless, for its limited effect, this Article helps us
grasp the importance of property law and theory in understanding U.S. legal
traditions and social policies. Specifically, zoning highlights the falsity of the
story depicting the first decades of the twentieth century as a gallant attempt by
fresh forces of good to storm that last stronghold of evil, antiquated forces-the
Court. The former were as committed as the latter to an old and entrenched
American ideology of property.
216. HOFSTADTER, supra note 136, at 18-22.
217. Id. at 131-86, 238; GILLMAN, supra note 97, at 148-49.
218. HOFSTADTER, supra note 136, at 12.
219. See, e.g., CUSHMAN, supra note 134; GILLMAN, supra note 97, at 192-93. While Gillman
tries to redeem the Court from its stereotypical depiction as class-biased and committed to laissez-faire,
and to instead situate it within general American constitutional history, he still perceives the Court as
representing an anachronistic ideology that was eventually wiped out by the Progressive onslaught.
220. For a critique of this predominant approach, see Kainen, supra note 57. Kainen's analysis
expands the focus beyond the textual interpretation of the Substantive Due Process Clause (highlighting
the retroactivity jurisprudence of the Court) and creates a framework for understanding the
constitutional history of economic rights and the emergence of substantive due process from a vantage
point outside the terms established by the debate over Lochner.
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C. Property Rights: From Freedom to Security
Paradoxically, it was this unyielding commitment that led to the truly
dramatic aspect of the choice made in Euclid: the complete change of course
from the traditional legal view of property in America. Euclid bridged the more
than century-old gap between the English and American conceptions of
property. One of property law's main social functions, as Joseph Singer
explains, is to establish "a compromise between the desire for change and the
desire for stability." 221 Property rights in England strongly tilted that
compromise in favor of the desire for stability, as they were primarily designed
to assure security to the owner-as indicated by the Rylands decision discussed
222above. In contrast, in the United States the compromise was skewed to the
benefit of the desire for change: freedom of the landowner to use her land as
she sees fit occupied center stage. Morton Horwitz has shown how this latter
conception crystallized in the United States as the idea of absolute dominion
over land changed during the nineteenth century. From a concept that provided
the owner with an absolute right to prevent any use of her neighbor's land that
conflicted with her quiet enjoyment, absolute dominion morphed into an
owner's absolute right to engage in any conduct on her property, regardless of
the injurious consequences to others. Ownership of property came to imply
above all the right to develop that property for business purposes; real estate
was transformed into just another cash-valued commodity, an instrumental
223value in the service of the paramount goal of promoting economic growth.
This uniquely American conception of landed property as dynamic market
commodity contrasted with the common law's static and agrarian conceptions
of property. These latter conceptions, well-suited to England's long-settled land
market, were quickly jettisoned by U.S. judges in the nineteenth century, once
it was clear they carried profound anti-developmental consequences if applied
224too rigidly to the New World. In the New World, where there was ample
land but little commercial development, where there was no aristocracy
concerned with land as a possession but many commercial entrepreneurs out to
strike it rich by developing and selling land, land was to be regarded primarily
as a productive asset, held for speculation and development, rather than as a
private domain.225
Euclid reconnected the New World to the Old. Roscoe Pound argued that
by the 1920s there was a noticeable trend toward the acceptance of the Rylands
rule in the United States. In his critique of the Bohlen thesis, Pound claimed
221. JOSEPH W. SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELDS: LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF
OWNERSHIP 30 (2000).
222. See supra notes 204-209 and accompanying text.
223. HORWITZ, supra note 57, at 31-54, 70-80, 99, 101-08.
224. Williams, supra note 78, at 278.
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that the Rylands decision was the outcome not of class interests, but of the
collectivism movement. This movement sought, in this context, to subject the
landowner to liability at his peril in the interest of general security. The
movement could become viable only in a crowded and developed country.
England was such a country in the mid-nineteenth century, and America was
226becoming one by the early decades of the twentieth century.
Euclid, which Pound never mentions, probably because it did not deal
with the Rylands rule, did reintroduce the Rylands conception of property. As
already seen, Euclid placed the right to security in landholding, to quiet
enjoyment of the homestead, at the forefront-at the expense of free
exploitation of property and commercial expansion. Having reached an
advanced level of development, America could rekindle the pastoral fantasies it
shared with England. As an imaginary space, the suburb was much closer to the
English countryside than to the bustling city, and for its preservation the same
conception of property was required. In neighborhoods with single-family
dwellings, as in the English countryside, property rights needed to shield the
detached home from commercial expansion, not to enable the owner to develop
her land freely. Freedom of action placed in the hands of the potentially greedy
owner would inevitably subvert the character of the environment and threaten
the stability of detached homeownership; and in these settings, the quality of
ownership that was to be protected above others was security against such
changes.
The right to private property, as it emerged from Euclid, privileged
security over freedom. Before Euclid, the nineteenth-century American attitude
toward legal liability was based on the assumption that the "quiet citizen must
keep out of the way of the exuberantly active one," as a contemporary
227commentator observed2. Against this background:
Euclidean zoning . . . transformed the orientation of property rights. It
transformed what used to be a negative liberty into a positive entitlement. Once
Euclidean zoning had taken over, each zoned lot came with a security-a legal
guarantee that neighbors would use their lots consistently with tastes, standards
and economic goals set by the control group in the local community. In the
process, Euclidean zoning also shifted a great deal of control over land-use
regulations from individual owners to local majorities and expert land-use
planners. Each local owner loses substantial freedom to control the use of his
own parcel of land, but ains the opportunity to vote on how his neighbors ought
to use their properties.
226. ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 105-09 (1946). For a discussion
of the acceptance of the Rylands rule in the United States at the time, see Shugerman, supra note 205.
227. HORWITZ, supra note 57, at 99 (quoting 1 BEVEN, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NEGLIGENCE 679 (2d ed. 1895)).
228. Claeys, supra note 90, at 741.
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This contrast between Euclid and the conception of property that preceded
it still discloses deeper historical fluctuations. The nineteenth-century
reconceptualization of property represented an effort to free U.S. law from the
restraints on economic development that had been molded by the common
law's feudal conception of property.229 The twentieth-century reversal
embodied in Euclid reinstated the spirit of those medieval restraints. "The New
Feudal System," as Pound labeled the emerging modern interdependent
community, was much more similar to the social order of the Middle Ages,
which was based on a self-sufficient community, than to the self-sufficient
individual man imagined in the nineteenth century.230 It therefore necessitated a
revival of old conceptions of property, which interpreted property not as merely
serving individual needs of protection from governmental power, but as
socially situated and performing a communal function. It called for static
conceptions of property that relegated an owner's freedom of action to a
secondary role.231
D. Zoning: An Embrace ofProperty Rights, Not ofRegulation
The handing down of the decision in Euclid was a momentous occasion; it
was a break with the recent past. As Haar wrote, extending the police power to
include zoning-the regulation of the activities and aspirations of private
property owners "must surely be acknowledged as one of the major judicial
innovations of our century as well as the most important redefinition of the
nature of private property ever made in United Stated courts." 232 But at the
heart of the revolution was not, as he claims "an extraordinary expansion of
government power into what previously had been considered a relatively
autonomous area of private decision making." 233 Governmental intervention
was merely a tool to further an invigorated conception of private property. U.S.
zoning was "never meant to tamper with the ethic of private property, [it] was
intended instead to secure the interest of property owners by enhancing the
economic stability of home ownership. ... 234
Euclid is so important not because it curtailed the weight of private
property in U.S. law-which it did not-but because it altered the internal
balance between the components of property rights. And it did so exactly in
order to sustain, in a changing environment, the traditionally central role played
by private property rights in U.S. law.
229. HORWITZ, supra note 57, at 47.
230. Roscoe Pound, The New Feudal System, 35 COM. L.J. 397 (1930).
231. Neo-medievalism was also apparent in the comeback of the restrictive covenant which
enabled the creation of homeowners associations, first appearing in the United States at approximately
the same time. See infra Section W.E.
232. Haar, supra note 78, at 334.
233. Id.
234. BOYER, supra note 112, at 153.
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The adoption of zoning therefore is a clear representation of the peculiar
way in which government action in America emerges time and again. In the
Progressive Era, statism burgeoned, paradoxically, from individualistic
concems-from the alarm at the growth of concentrated economic power. The
Progressives wanted a strong government to counterbalance these interests by
reinstating and protecting the small owner or entrepreneur. 235 The Progressive
agenda called for government action, and yet, it was not a drastic split from the
accepted ideological or legal attitude toward government. There was, at least in
the realm of property rights, no internal contradiction inherent to this agenda:
most Progressives at the time (unlike current-day libertarians) rightly and fully
realized that private ownership and regulation are not locked into a zero-sum
game. Quite the opposite-regulation is, and always was, necessary for
sustaining private property.236 Zoning was one of the tools that allowed
Progressives to "keep the benefits of the emerging organization of life and yet
to retain the scheme of individualistic values that this organization was
[supposedly] destroying." 237
This dynamic that led to the adoption of zoning has too often been
misunderstood, leading to regrettable legal results. As this Article has
illustrated, Euclid stands for private property rights and for their redefinition.
Euclid does not stand for the embrace of regulation, and hence, it does not
stand for the empowerment of local governments per se. It cannot serve as a
meaningful precedent for deviating from the constitutional principle according
to which local governments are mere delegates of the states that have created
231them. Euclid did not inevitably lead to the more recent Supreme Court
decisions that bestowed almost limitless legal powers on cities when managing
their own affairs, in the process enabling the most blatant forms of exclusionary
zoning. While, as a side effect of its operational ruling, Euclid clearly served
municipal governments, the fortification of local boundaries and the espousal
of localism as a good in and of itself cannot be attributed to the adoption of
zoning.2 39 These were rather the outcome of Court decisions from the 1970s,
235. HOFSTADTER, supra note 136, at 234-35.
236. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 94, 171-74
(2000); Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611, 650-52 (1988).
237. HOFSTADTER, supra note 136, at 217.
238. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907); 1 JOHN DILLON, THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448-55 (5th ed. 1911) (expounding the generally accepted "Dillon's Rule"
according to which local government power is restricted to actions authorized by enabling state
legislation).
239. For an example of a writer making this attribution, see Stahl, supra note 46, at 1263-68,
who argues that Euclid's revolutionary impact was in holding zoning to be "a local entitlement rather
than a delegation from the state, an entitlement every bit as inviolable as the single-family home it was
designed to protect." For a description that is more in line with the argument of this Article, see Richard
Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1843, 1872 (1994) (arguing that though the Euclid decision was based on the idea that local democratic
processes legitimate the exercise of the zoning power, "the local-control rationale in Euclid arguably had
more to do with providing a proxy for private control than with promoting the autonomy of cities. ...
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which, for example, upheld, with only flimsy grounding in Euclid, a local
zoning ordinance limiting the number of unrelated residents living together to
two240 and that blocked school desegregation efforts that crossed municipal
lines.24 1 Euclid had little to do with these results, and denying their wisdom
does not entail or necessitate eschewing the local power to engage in zoning. A
sacrosanct local power to regulate private activities and to control the provision
of public services is not, analytically or theoretically, an inescapable
culmination of a decision for which local regulation was merely a secondary
concern, a means but not an end.
Local regulation was introduced solely as a tool to sustain private
property, as this latter institution is understood in Jeffersonian terms. Thus,
when doubts began surfacing as to regulation's utility in furthering suburban
242homeownership, regulation came under attack. Lawyers and public figures
are attacking zoning today under the banner of the same conception of property
that in Euclid justified zoning. The legitimacy of governmental regulation is
being doubted, since it is perceived as interfering with the security aspect of the
right to property. Despite this attack on Euclid, it will live on. Its operative
ruling may dissolve, but the conception of property it introduced will for the
foreseeable future remain a constitutive part of U.S. property law.
E. Euclid's Conception ofProperty Eighty-Five Years Later
Euclid's conception of ownership has persisted even though the current
law of property and contemporary urban environments differ from those
confronting the Euclid Court. Hence, it is instructive to conclude the discussion
of the legacy of Euclid with a few observations regarding more recent
demographic and legal developments and the ways in which they intersect with
the security-based suburban conception of property as it emerged from Euclid.
The two trends presented in the following short paragraphs are, of course, far
from being the only relevant ones, yet they carry particular interest, and thus,
merit at least tentative and brief presentation.
As explained in Part III, ownership was reinvented in Euclid as a response
to the demographic patterns of the era. Those patterns prevailed through most
of the twentieth century. For more than a hundred years, a consistent double
movement-centripetal and centrifugal-remade America's landscape. On the
one hand, metropolitan areas grew, and on the other hand, those same
[The decision thus reflected the] tension between the conception of cities as political communities and
the competing conception of cities as efficient mechanisms for the expression of private rights . . . .").
240. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). While Justice Douglas perceived
Euclid as, along with other unrelated decisions, a governing precedent, Justice Marshall noted that the
decision cannot be based on Euclid, since Euclid dealt with the rights of owners to protection of their
property, whereas the regulation at hand was challenged by nonowners claiming interference with their
right to free association.
241. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1973).
242. See sources cited supra notes 39-41.
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metropolitan areas endured massive fragmentation as the traditional central
cities lost residents, businesses, and power. Lately, however, this latter process,
commonly-though not necessarily accurately-known as "suburbanization" 243
has encountered a seemingly offsetting trend: "gentrification." "Gentrification
is a process . .. by which poor and working-class neighborhoods in the inner-
city are refurbished via an influx of private capital and middle-class
homebuyers and renters-neighborhoods that had previously experienced
disinvestment and a middle-class exodus." 2" Since the aversion to city living
conditions was a major driving force in the reinvention of the image of the
yeoman landholder, gentrification, as a middle-class reembrace of the city,
could have signified a lessening in the power of the Euclid's idea of ownership.
Nonetheless, at least so far, this has not been the case. First, the
rediscovery of the central city by some members of the middle class does not
imply the negation of the embrace of the single-family dwellings
neighborhood. There is no sign that the rise of gentrification has diminished
contemporary suburbanization. The processes have in fact come to live side by
side in and around the American city.245 Second, and more importantly for the
purposes of this Article's thesis, the fascination with specific inner-city
neighborhoods need not-and does not-entail the widespread adoption of
tenancy relationships or of a different form of ownership than the one promoted
by Euclid.
An urban legal environment that is decidedly different from that which the
Euclid Justices encountered greets those members of the middle-class returning
to the city today. Living in a multiple-family dwelling nowadays-in the inner-
city or elsewhere-does not automatically mean assuming the legal status of a
tenant. State condominium laws have made it possible to easily bestow separate
ownership of individual units within one building upon residents.246 Indeed,
and not at all surprisingly, the relocation of middle-class residents to inner-city
neighborhoods is closely associated with the availability of condominium units
for sale in those locales.247
243. See supra Section L.A.
244. NEIL SMITH, THE NEW URBAN FRONTIER: GENTRIFICATION AND THE REVANCHIST CITY
32 (1996).
245. Id. at 39-40; see SMITH, supra note 244, at 54-55; Richard T. LeGates & Chester
Hartman, The Anatomy ofDisplacement in the United States, in GENTRIFICATION OF THE CITY 178, 180-
81 (Neil Smith & Peter Williams eds., 1986); Bruce London & J. John Palen, Introduction: Some
Theoretical and Practical Issues Regarding Inner-City Revitalization, in GENTRIFICATION,
DISPLACEMENT AND NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION 4, 6-7 (J. John Palen & Bruce London eds.,
1984).
246. See sources cited supra note 153.
247. The conversion of existing rental building to condominiums is a major component of the
gentrification of neighborhoods. It leads to displacement of local poorer residents and is a clear threat to
the character of existing neighborhoods. Accordingly, many municipalities experiencing gentrification
have adopted condominium conversion legislation. Condominium conversion legislation may include in
the extreme a moratorium with or without the introduction of special permits to allow exceptions. It
might also oblige owners to compensate tenants before converting their buildings into condominiums.
However, the courts' approach to such legislation has been relatively hostile. See FRUG, supra note 129,
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Yet, condominium laws have done more than merely allow the new city
residents to preserve their status as owners even when leaving their detached
residences. This legal reform has also enabled them to retain the specific form
of ownership originally inspired by the single-family dwelling model
envisioned in Euclid. In fact, condominium laws have reinforced it.
Homeowners associations and condominiums, which today house more than
sixty million Americans, 2 4 8 promote, perhaps even epitomize, the security-
focused notion of ownership.
Planned communities, such as condominiums and homeowners
associations, are sustained by restrictive covenants. Traditionally, property law
placed many restrictions on the ability to create and enforce restrictive
covenants, which curtailed the freedom of an owner to use her land. The legal
drive to liberalize these old laws, culminating in the adoption of the
Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) in 2000, has facilitated the
placement of intrusive restrictions on the right of an owner to use her land.249
Today, such legally enforceable restrictions can, for example, forbid
250 251252repainting, constructing or dismantling a fence,   hanging curtains,
planting trees,253 wok-cooking,254 or keeping pets.255 Covenants might also
at 81-82; Bernard V. Keenan, Condominium Conversion of Residential Rental Units: A Proposal for
State Regulation and a Model Act, 20 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 639 (1987); Peter J. McDonald, Note,
Displacement in Gentrifying Neighborhoods: Regulating Condominium Conversion Through Municipal
Land Use Control, 63 B.U. L. REV. 955 (1983).
248. According to estimates, as of 2009, 60.1 million Americans were living in homeowners
associations, condominiums, or cooperatives, of which there were 305,400. Homeowners associations
account for 52-55% of the totals, condominiums for 38-42% and cooperatives for 5-7%. Industry Data,
THE CMTY. ASs'NS INST., available at http://www.caionline.org/info/research/Pages/default.aspx
(listing estimates based on U.S. Census Publications, American Housing Survey, IRS statistics of
Income Reports, California and Florida state-specific information, related association industry trade
groups, and collaboration with industry professionals). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §
6.2 (2000) refers to all of these as "common-interest-communities." In both a condominium and a
homeowners association, each buyer owns her unit. The major difference between condominiums and
homeowners associations lies in the manner in which common property (those parts of the community
other than the individually owned units) is held. In a condominium, the common property is owned in
common by all the unit owners (and managed by the condominium board as their agent), while under a
homeowners association, the association has title to the common property and the property owners have
membership interests in the association.
249. For more on restrictive covenants and homeowners associations, see, for example,
MCKENZIE, supra note 152; Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential
Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1989); and James L. Winokur, The Mixed
Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and
Personal Identity, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 1.
250. W. Hill Colony, Inc. v. Sauerwein, 138 N.E.2d 403 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
251. Cohen v. Kite Hill Cmty. Ass'n, 191 Cal. Rptr. 209 (Ct. App. 1983).
252. Paula A. Franzese, Does It Take a Village? Privatization, Patterns of Restrictiveness and
the Demise of Community, 47 VILL. L. REV. 553, 556 (2002).
253. Ironwood Owners Ass'n IX v. Solomon, 224 Cal. Rptr. 18 (Ct. App. 1986).
254. Franzese, supra note 252, at 556 (citing N.R. Kleinfeld & Tracie Rozhon, In Flat Market,
Co-op Life Has Steep Ups and Downs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1995, at Al).
255. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994). But see CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1360.5 (West 2007) (making it illegal for a homeowners association to prohibit owners from
keeping at least one pet, subject to reasonable regulation).
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256limit an owner's freedom to lease her property or to sell it on the market.
These few examples illustrate the extent to which the restrictive covenant
isolates a house in a condominium or homeowners association from potentially
destabilizing adjacent uses. They highlight the manner in which the restrictive
covenant serves the security aspect of an owner's property right at the expense
of her freedom. The restrictive covenant achieves this goal to a degree that
could never have been attained by reliance on zoning. Zoning is a form of
public regulation serving the security-minded idea of ownership and justified
by its relation to it; the restrictive covenant is simply zoning's private law
equivalent in this regard. Homeowners associations and condominiums are
proof that the security-based definition of ownership, which emerged from
Euclid, has not only endured, but is actually thriving all around us.
Conclusion
An "ownership society" is a hollow notion if there is no image of
ownership governing it. Governmental policies subsidizing and aggressively
promoting homeownership cannot be contemplated before a consensus emerges
regarding the desired form of ownership. Once such a consensus comes into
being, it defines certain forms of public regulation as protecting ownership
rather than interfering with it. In fact, such forms of government activity might
cease to be perceived as regulation altogether. In America, this transformative
moment occurred during the first quarter of the twentieth century. While U.S.
jurists and laymen remained attached to a Jeffersonian populist conception of
property, they were facing a new world. In order to safeguard the values
associated with small landholding, the image of ownership had to shift; in order
to survive, the yeoman image had to be reworked into its closest approximation
possible in a novel reality. The suburban image of property was born.
In this new image, property was to mean something new. No longer would
property entail mainly freedom of action. After Euclid, it would first and
foremost assure protection from change. Property would still ideologically be
perceived as essential to Americans' individual well-being, as well as to the
persistence of American democracy, but its content would differ from what it
had been before. Property law, the principles of urban planning, as well as
federal and state policies, would all have to adapt. For while property's role and
promise might remain constant, property itself is anything but a static notion.
256. Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136 (Ct. App. 1981) (holding that
a restriction on the right of alienation requiring that the condominium board consent to a sale will be
upheld if exercised reasonably); Franklin v. Spadafora, 447 N.E.2d 1244 (Mass. 1983) (upholding a
covenant limiting the number of units a person can own in a condominium, thereby barring a sale of a
unit from one resident to the other); Worthinglen Condo. Unit Owners' Ass'n v. Brown, 566 N.E.2d
1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a condominium declaration prohibited leases).
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